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SEARCHING FOR THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
John M.A. DiPippa*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment1 is unique among the provisions of the Bill
of Rights. Unlike other amendments, where the motivation behind their
passage is unclear, we know why the fourth amendment was enacted:
to restrain judicial power and to prohibit general searches.2 The mem-
ory of the oppressive writs of assistance in the colonies, and before
them the general warrants in England, were still fresh in the minds of
the men who participated in the formation of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights.3 The absence of a Bill of Rights and, in particular, a
search and seizure provision was a matter of some controversy during
the debate over the ratification of the Constitution.4
The language the framers chose possesses both "the virtue of brev-
ity and the vice of ambiguity." 5 The fifty-four words of the amendment
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; B.A.,
West Chester University; J.D., Washington and Lee University.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. "The Fourth Amendment ... was drafted by the framers for the express purpose of pro-
viding enforceable safeguards against a recurrence of highhanded search measures" carried out in
England and in the colonies. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH & SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20
(1966) [hereinafter cited as LANDYNSKI]. See also Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 42 U. CI. L. REV. 47, 50 (1974) ("The central theme of the amendment is its prohibition
against general searches."). The clarity of the Framers' purpose is in marked contrast to the
ambiguity surrounding other sections of the Constitution. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (historical background of fourteenth amendment "inconclusive" on its applica-
tion to public education).
3. LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at 38-42. Luminaries like Patrick Henry and James Madison
argued that the potential scope of federal power required a prohibition on general searches. Id. at
40-41.
4. Virginia and New York ratified the Constitution but with a call for a Bill of Rights which
would include a proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures. North Carolina also proposed
a Bill of Rights with a search provision but refused to ratify the Constitution. Although both
Pennsylvania and Maryland ratified the Constitution without a call for any amendments there was
strong sentiment in both states for a Bill of Rights with two search and seizure provisions. Id.
5. Id. at 42. James Madison's first draft of what was to become the fourth amendment read:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, their houses, their papers, and
their other property shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause,
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absolutely proscribe unreasonable searches and seizures while at the
same time establish standards for the issuance of search and arrest
warrants.0 On the other hand, the amendment does not define any of its
key terms, and does not explain the relationship of the reasonableness
clause to the probable cause and particularity clause.'
supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
Id. at 41.
The Committee to which the draft was referred altered it so that it read:
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall
not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or
things to be seized.
Id.
Benson of New York wanted to make the provision stronger by deleting the phrase "by warrants
issuing" and substitute the words "and no warrant shall issue" but his motion did not command a
majority vote. Id. at 41-42. Yet Benson's Committee reported his version to the whole body and it
was this version which was adopted and ultimately became the fourth amendment. Id. Apparently,
Benson, the chairman of the Committee, manipulated the process to report out his defeated ver-
sion and managed to win approval. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 101-03 (1937). See also Stelzner, The
Fourth Amendment: The Reasonableness and the Warrant Clauses, 10 N. M. L. REV. 33, 38-41
(1980).
6. The police have probable cause when: "[Tihe facts and circumstances within their knowl-
edge and of which they [have] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a
prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense [or
that particular items connected with criminal activity are located in a particular place]." Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Although the requirement of probable cause applies to all warrants,
some administrative warrants are governed by a special probable cause standard. Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Probable cause to issue warrants for area searches for hous-
ing code compliance exists "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular building." Id. at 538. Warrants must be
issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Attorney General of State not neu-
tral and detached) and Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) (magistrate who
accompanied police in raid on adult bookstore to review obscenity of items seized no longer de-
tached). A magistrate need not be a lawyer or a judge so long as he or she is neutral and detached
and is capable of determining probable cause. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
Any warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Probable cause is a non-technical, com-
mon-sense concept. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Reviewing courts must defer to a mag-
istrate's determination of probable cause if a "substantial basis" supports it. Massachusetts v.
Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984).
7. LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at 42. Landynski argued that the historical background of the
amendment made the relationship between the clauses clear:
The first clause-"The right of the people to be secure . ..against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated"-recognized as already existing a right to
freedom from arbitrary governmental invasion of privacy and did not seek to create or
confer such a right. It was evidently meant to re-emphasize (and, in some undefined
way, strengthen) the requirements for a valid warrant set forth in the second clause.
The second, in turn, defines and interprets the first, telling us the kind of search that is
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This mixture of clarity and purpose and brevity and ambiguity in
expression has generated a complex body of law laden with rules and
riddled with exceptions.8 At one time, the Supreme Court interpreted
the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment to have inde-
pendent significance. Warrantless searches were judged by the standard
of reasonableness found in the first clause.' In recent years, the Court
has eschewed the reasonableness standard for a more mechanical focus:
warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless justified by
one of several exceptions. 10 Of course, a search conducted pursuant to a
warrant must meet the requirements of the second clause of the
amendment: probable cause, 1 particularity, and a neutral and de-
tached magistrate. 2 If a warrantless search has not fallen within one of
the exceptions or if the warrant has not complied with the requirements
of the amendment, the evidence obtained as a result of the search has
not "unreasonable," and therefore not forbidden, namely, the one carried out under the
safeguards there specified.
Id. at 43.
Landynski concluded that two correct interpretations of the amendment were possible: (I) to be
reasonable a search must meet the requirement of the warrant clause or (2) a search which meets
those requirements might still be unreasonable. He rejected an interpretation which would find
some warrantless searches reasonable. Id. at 42-43.
8. A commentator once succinctly declared that "[t]he Fourth Amendment cases are a
mess." Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering,
48 IND. L. J. 329 (1973). Most observers agree that time has not changed the truth of Dworkin's
statement.
9. United States v. Rabbinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (reasonableness of searches to be deter-
mined by facts and circumstances of each case). But see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (Rabbinowitz no longer to be followed).
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967)). Although the Court has spoken of a few, well-defined and jealously guarded
exceptions, rhetoric does not match reality. There are at least seven exceptions to the warrant
requirement: Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to arrest); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, (1970) (automobiles); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (exi-
gent circumstances); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (station-house inventories);
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983) (plain view); Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (consent searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (protective "frisk"). It can be argued
that the exceptions are not few. See Haddad, Well Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and
Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 198 (1977).
II. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (probable cause is a non-technical conception
best reviewed by a totality of the circumstances standard). See also U.S. v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405
(1984) (unless magistrate misled by a false affidavit, abandons his judicial role, or the warrant is
so facially deficient that a police officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid, suppression is
not a proper remedy if police in objective good faith rely on warrant even though it may not meet
the required standards for probable cause). See supra note 6.
12. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (fourth amendment does
not contemplate the Executive Officers of the Government as neutral and detached magistrates).
See supra note 6.
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been suppressed. 13
The exact definition of the term "search" for fourth amendment
purposes is much more important under the Court's more recent ap-
proach. Under a reasonableness standard, police activity can be justi-
fied by reference to the totality of the circumstances. In theory, the
Court's recent approach greatly limits the scope of permissible war-
rantless police activity. If the police activity is not a "search" then the
fourth amendment simply does not apply. 4 Neither the probable cause
requirement,"5 nor the particularity requirement,1 6 nor the warrant re-
quirement,1 7 need be met. Nor must the police activity be squeezed
within any of the exceptions." For those who follow the crime control
model of criminal law,19 defining such activity outside the fourth
amendment has great appeal because of the flexibility it gives the po-
lice in fighting crime. For civil libertarians, such a prospect is not well
received.20 When police activity is placed outside the confines of the
fourth amendment, other limitations are hard to impose. Any restric-
tions must come from internal police policies,2  state constitutions, 22 or
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 443 (1961). Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971); and U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977). The good faith exception greatly narrows
the scope of the exclusionary rule when a search warrant is issued. See supra note 1I.
14. See. e.g., Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
See generally Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable v. The Fourth Amendment Satis-
fied: The Neglected Threshold of "So What?," 1977 S. ILL. U. L. J. 75.
15. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
16. See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
17. See Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983).
18. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
19. H. PACKER. THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
20. I confess that I am a civil libertarian. During my work on this article I have attempted to
achieve the much sought after scholarly detachment. Complete detachment is impossible, how-
ever. I apologize in advance if my viewpoint unduly colors my analysis.
21. See, e.g., Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974),
where Professor Kaplan suggests that exclusion of improperly obtained evidence not proper when
the government can show that it published regulations to guide police officers, trained them to
alleviate fourth amendment violations, and took disciplinary action when violations occurred. Id.
at 1050-51. See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
1.2(f) n.87 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE], for a collection of citations.
22. See. e.g., People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919
(1973) (police violated federal and state constitutions by inspecting defendant's trash). A decision
which rests on an adequate and independent state ground cannot be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). The state-law ground must be clear
from the opinion itself. Id. Justice Stevens has begun to campaign for increased reliance by State
Courts on their own Constitutions. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984).
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and chastised the Supreme Court of Massachusetts for
"unwisely and unnecessarily" inviting United States Supreme Court review by not analyzing the
case under state law. See generally Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State's Bill of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). See also Note, Decriminalization: A New Consideration
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other provisions of the United States Constitution.2" The question of
what constitutes a search is the fundamental inquiry in fourth amend-
ment analysis.
During the 1983-84 Term, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided six cases in which the dispositive question was whether or not
governmental activity constituted a search. This article will survey the
development of the case law on this question prior to the 1983-84 Term
and then examine four of the six cases. These four cases greatly narrow
the definition of a search and contribute to the conceptual confusion in
this area of the law. In addition, these cases revitalize the once-dis-
carded "protected place" theory of the fourth amendment. When the
cases cannot be decided by reference to a protected place, the Court
silently uses a balancing test.
II. THE EARLY CASES
In an early series of cases the Supreme Court defined a search by
reference to property law. Thus, in Olmstead v. United States2 4 the
for The Fourth Amendment Balance, 31 ME. L. REV. 375 (1980) where the author argues that
civil penalties should be used to enforce the fourth amendment. See generally Clark, Civil and
Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV.
379 (1976); Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty
Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974).
23. In one early case the Supreme Court suggested that the protections of the fourth and
fifth amendments ran together. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (court noted the
"intimate relation" of the two amendments). This position has been eroded steadily over the years
until its implicit reversal in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); See Note, The Life and
Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977). Given the testimonial
requirement for fifth amendment protection, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and
the requirement of formal judicial proceedings to invoke the sixth amendment, Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the only other constitutional provision which might restrain the
police in the investigative stage of a criminal case is the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbi-
trary intrusion by the police which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society."). The violation must be inimical to a scheme of "Ordered Liberty." Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937). Such an approach only protects against extremely abusive practices. Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (police "shocke[d] the conscience" of the court when they
illegally entered defendant's home, tried to pry open his mouth, and then forced a doctor to pump
his stomach). Presumably, exclusion is the appropriate remedy for evidence obtained in this man-
ner. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 443 (1961). But cf. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984),
(exclusion appropriate when it will deter police conduct). For all practical purposes, once investi-
gative conduct falls outside of the scope of the fourth amendment, the conduct is not bound by
any constitutional restrictions.
24. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Most of these early cases involved wiretapping. This area is now
controlled by statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982). This act is commonly referred to as Title
Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See generally J. CARR, THE LAW
OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1977). The classic work in this area is S. DASH, THE EAVESDROP-
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Court held that the fourth amendment was not violated by wire-taps on
external telephone wires because "there was no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants."25 This principle was applied in Goldman v.
United States26  where the Court upheld the use of a device which,
when placed against a wall, allowed the government to hear conversa-
tions in an adjoining room. 27 The Court saw "no reasonable or logical
distinction" between Goldman and Olmstead.28
Application of the trespass principle led to suppression of the evi-
dence whenever any physical entry on the defendant's property oc-
curred. In Silverman v. United States,2 9 for example, the police em-
ployed a "Spikemike," a microphone with a foot-long spike attached to
it.30 When inserted into a wall, the spike picked up conversations in
different rooms of the house.31 The Court reversed the conviction be-
cause the evidence was obtained by means of an unauthorized physical
intrusion onto the property.32 The Court noted that the decision did not
PERS (1959).
25. 277 U.S. at 464. The case may also turn on the intangible nature of the thing searched
and seized-telephone conversations. The Court said that "[tihe Amendment itself shows that the
search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description
of the warrant necessary to make the proceedings lawful is that it must specify the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized." Id. The position that the amendment protects
only tangible items was reprised by Justice Black. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). The suggestion that the particularity requirement gives some meaning to the term
"search" was rejected by the Court in United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
26. 316 U.S. 129 (1940).
27. Id. at 996. The Court described this device, known as a "detectaphone," as "having a
receiver so delicate as, when placed against the partition wall, to pick up sound waves originating
in [the defendant's] office." Id. at 944. Ironically, the government agents intended to rely upon a
bug placed inside the defendant's office but it did not work. Id. The detectaphone was their fail-
safe equipment. If the original bug had worked, the evidence would have been suppressed because
the agents trespassed during its installation and because a wire ran from the bug into the adjoin-
ing room. Id. This has led one contemporary authority to say that the legality of the search "de-
pended solely upon the officer's selection of the right equipment and location for overhearing the
conversation." J. CARR, supra note 24, at 13-14.
28. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940). The Court also refused to overrule
Olmstead. Id.
29. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
30. Id. at 506.
31. The spike rested against a heating duct which "acted as a very good sounding board." Id.
This converted the entire heating system into a conductor of sound. Id. The Supreme Court ap-
provingly cited the dissenting judge's characterization of the duct as a "giant microphone, running
through the entire house." Id. at 509 (citing Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173, 179 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (Washington, J., dissenting)). Although the unauthorized invasion is usually thought to
be the spike's slight intrusion upon the property, comments like the above support the argument
that the "intrusion" was the transformation of the heating system into a microphone. In other
words, the government "usurped" the heating system. Id. at 511. But see Clinton v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 158 (1964) (illegal search when device attached to wall by a thumbtack).
32. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. at 511.
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turn on "the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of
local law." 3 Rather the case turned on "the reality of an actual intru-
sion into a constitutionally protected area.'' 84
These cases and others came to stand for the rule that unless the
police intruded upon a "protected place," no fourth amendment search
occurred. 35 In response the courts created a catalogue of protected
places and prohibited activities.3 6 The crudeness of the physical intru-
sion rule and the burgeoning electronic surveillance technology gener-
ated much academic and judicial criticism." The stage was set for a
reexamination of the doctrine. This reexamination came in Katz v.
United States. 8 In Katz, F.B.I. agents placed an electronic "bug" on
top of a telephone booth to monitor the defendant's conversations.3 9
The agents knew that the defendant used this particular phone booth at
about the same time each day.' They monitored only the defendant's
end of the conversation. 4 1 At trial, transcripts of his conversations were
admitted, and they helped convict the defendant of betting by means of
an interstate communication facility. 42
The court of appeals affirmed his conviction and rejected his
fourth amendment claim because "[t]here was no physical entrance"
by the government into the phone booth.'3 In the Supreme Court, Katz
argued that a telephone booth was a protected place while the govern-
ment contended that it was not."
33. Id. at 512.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1966).
36. A house and its curtilage were protected places, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1913), but the open fields were not. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Accord Oliver
v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). See infra notes 115-81 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1966);
LANDYNSKI, supra note 2; and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. Id. at 348.
40. Id. at 354 n.14. The government made six recordings averaging about three minutes
each. Id.
4 I. Id.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1982).
43. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966). See supra text accompanying
notes 21-23.
44. 389 U.S. at 351. These contentions sprung from Katz' formulation of the issues:
A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected place so that
evidence obtained by an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth
is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.
B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary
1984]
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Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart criticized the formula-
tion of the issues saying that the correct solution to fourth amendment
problems "is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase
'constitutionally protected area.' "4 He went on to say that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . .But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."
Even though Katz could be seen through the glass walls of the
phone booth, he retained his right to keep the contents of his conversa-
tions private. 47 When Katz entered the booth to use the phone he was
entitled to assume that his conversations would not be "broadcast to
the world."' 8 Because the government violated the "privacy upon which
[Katz] justifiably relied" the electronic eavesdropping was a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.4 9
The Court rejected the government's argument that Olmstead v.
United States and Goldman v. United States controlled the outcome
because there had been no physical penetration of the phone booth."
The Court found that the "premise that property interests control the
right of the, government to search and seize has been discredited. 5 1
before a search and seizure can be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
Id. at 349-50.
45. Id. at 350. Justice Stewart also noted that the "Fourth Amendment cannot be translated
into a general right of privacy" because while it preserves privacy against governmental intrusions,
it offers both more and less protection than a general right of privacy affords. Id. One's fourth
amendment rights may be violated in public. Id. at n.4. On the other hand, the general right to
privacy protects against invasions of privacy by private persons while the fourth amendment does
not. Compare Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) and Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921).
46. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
47. Id. at 352. The government contended that this visibility vitiated any privacy Katz might
have in his phone calls. Id. The court rejected this position saying that Katz sought to exclude not
the "intruding eye" but the "uninvited ear." Id. The court limited the reach of the "uninvited
ear" notion in White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), when it held that Katz did not bar
the warrantless use of bugged informers. See infra text accompanying notes 78-99. See also
Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment
Activities, Probable Cause and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 425, 435-38
(1978).
48. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
49. Id. at 353.
50. Id. at 352.
51. Id. at 353 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)). The full quotation from
Hayden is: "The premise that property interests control the right of the government to search and
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The Court had "departed from the narrow view" on which Olmstead
rested.52
Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply "ar-
eas"-against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.53
The Court concluded that the "underpinnings" of Olmstead and
Goldman had been so eroded by the Court's decisions that the "tres-
pass doctrine" no longer controlled. Because the eavesdropping consti-
tuted a search and because it did not fit within any of the exceptions to
the warrant clause,54 the search violated the fourth amendment and the
seize has been discredited. (Citations omitted). We have recognized the principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and fictional and procedural
barriers rested on property concepts." 389 U.S. at 353. Hayden did away with the "mere evi-
dence" rule which limited the government's right to search and seize only items in which it had a
superior proprietary interest. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (government
may seize instrumentalities or fruits of crime or contraband because interests of government supe-
rior to those of defendant). Hayden only requires a "nexus-automatically provided in the case of
fruits, instrumentalities and contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal behavior."
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307. But see, Schlesinger & Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deter-
rence: The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 225 (1980) where the
authors argue for a return to a fourth amendment jurisprudence based on property concepts.
These authors do not see the exclusionary rule as based on privacy or deterrence but rather "as an
obvious consequence of the government's illegal appropriation of privately owned goods." Profes-
sor Loewy used Hayden to develop the premise that the government has a right to search for and
seize evidence of crime. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device to Protect the Innocent, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1984). But see White, Some Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule"
Debate, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1273 (1983). Loewy goes on to establish the related position that the
fourth amendment does not protect the right to secret evidence of a crime. Loewy, supra, at 1244.
52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. The Court cited Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961),
to show that a violation of the Fourth Amendment could occur "without any technical trespass
under . . . local property law." 389 U.S. at 353.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 359. The government raised three arguments in this regard. First, it claimed that
the search was constitutionally reasonable because they did not install the tap until their investiga-
tion showed that there was a "strong probability" that Katz was breaking the law, the surveillance
was limited in both scope and duration, it was limited to the times Katz used the booth and then
only to his end of the conversation. The Court responded that if this account were true there
would be no reason why a magistrate would not have issued a warrant. Id. at 354. A warrant
would have accommodated the interest of the government and the rights of the individual. Id. at
355-56. Second, the government asked that the court retroactively validate the agents' conduct
because they had relied on Olmstead and Goldman and had done no more than they could have
done with a warrant. Id. at 356. In some ways this argument resembles the newly created good
faith exception. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). See generally Kamisar, Does (Did)
(Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Pro-
position?" 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress
Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978). In any event, the Court rejected this contention
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evidence should have been excluded. 6
Justice Harlan read the holding narrowly in a concurring opin-
ion."6 He saw no way to decide how much protection the amendment
afforded except by reference to place. In a concurring opinion stating
his understanding of the rule in Katz, Justice Harlan said: "[Tihere is
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "58 This state-
ment became the accepted interpretation of Katz5" although Justice
Harlan had some second thoughts about it.60
Katz was hailed immediately as a great achievement.61 One com-
mentator declared that Katz released the fourth amendment from "the
moorings of precedent." 2 Future fourth amendment questions would
be decided "by the logic of its central concepts."' 3 Fourth amendment
law was rid of its antiquated focus on property concepts64 and could
because without a warrant the only restraint on the agents' conduct was self-imposed. Katz, 389
U.S. at 356. But cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984) (improper warrant form
no bar to evidence when police confine themselves to scope of affidavit). The fourth amendment
requires the interposition of a magistrate between the citizens and the police. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Finally, the Court rejected the government's request to create a new
exception to the warrant clause. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358.
55. Id. at 359.
56. Justice Harlan read the opinion to hold that 1) a telephone booth is a protected area, 2)
electronic invasion of a protected place may violate the amendment, and 3) warrantless searches
of protected areas are presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). In his
classic article, Professor Amsterdam argued that the proper reading of Katz was broader than
Justice Harlan's. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
383-86 (1974).
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143-44 n.12 (1978); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8, 14-15 (1973).
60. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (formulations of
fourth amendment analysis, including Katz, have limitations and can lead to the substitution of
words for analysis).
61. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SuP. CT. REV.
133.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. This statement is, like most statements concerning so-called legal revolutions, an oversim-
plification. See, e.g., Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. J. 1198 (1971). Professor
Ashdown provides a fuller treatment of the "detailed and complex history" of the shift from prop-
erty concepts to privacy concepts. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "'Legitimate Expec-
tation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1298-1301 (1981). Ironically, dissatisfaction with the
current Supreme Court's handling of privacy issues has spurred a call for a return to a fourth
amendment jurisprudence centered on property interests. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94
HARv. L. REv. 75, 203 (1980) (ownership and possession should be reinstituted as the core of the
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now protect citizens from the excesses of modern investigative
technology.65
Katz has not been without its critics, however. The Katz test has
been called vague, shifting, and illusory.6  One commentator has char-
acterized Katz as a "lawless ruling-a decision to do without a stan-
dard and a decision to tie the constitutional right to privacy to chang-
ing cultural expectations of privacy. ' ' 67 If Katz were read to require a
warrant for every governmental investigation the process would be triv-
ialized by its use.' 8 Moreover, the almost limitless contours of an ex-
pectations analysis has led courts to apply Katz in important and not so
important cases.6 9
In spite of this criticism, it seems fair to say that Katz was meant
to expand and not contract the scope of the fourth amendment.7 0 Katz
invited the Supreme Court to engage in a normative analysis designed
to explicate the central tenets of fourth amendment security in a time
protection of privacy); Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76
MICH. L. REV. 154, 180, 182 (1977) (property interests should be recognized as a priori reasona-
ble expectations of privacy). Cf. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4
N. ILL. U. L. REV. I, 16-17 (1983) (Katz does not support proposition that property interests are
irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis).
65. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Ironically,
cases like Katz and Olmstead would not arise today because of the passage of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 8, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520) (1982) [hereinafter described as Title III]. Title III proscribes wire
tapping or bugging unless certain procedural safeguards are met, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Attorney
General must authorize application for an order), and unless prior judicial approval is obtained 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (judge of court of competent jurisdiction can issue order authorizing the procedure
with limited scope and duration). Violations of the provisions of Title III can result in criminal
penalties, 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(1) (willful violations punishable by $10,000 fine, five years in prison,
or both). See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gold-
smith, 483 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); civil liability, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (authorizes recovery of
actual damages or a civil penalty, punitive damages, and costs and fees); or suppression of the
evidence in a criminal proceeding. 18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a) and (b). Although the Supreme Court
has not yet considered the constitutionality of Title IlI, every court save one to consider the ques-
tion has upheld the Act against constitutional challenges. See J. CARR, supra note 24, at 33 n. 116-
17, for a collection of cases. Finally, even though Title Ill was designed to bring uniformity to this
area of the law, states are allowed to adopt their own laws. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). It is conceded,
however, that state laws may be more protective of individual rights but not less protective than
Title III. S. REP. No. 1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 2112, 2187.
Twenty seven states responded by enacting their own legislation. See C. FISHMAN, WIRE TAPPING
AND EAVESDROPPING 6 n.14 (1978) for a collection of jurisdictions.
66. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 202 (1980).
67. Alschuler, supra note 64, at 6 n.12.
68. Kitch, supra note 61, at 152.
69. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 202-03 (1980), citing exam-
ples of trivial applications of the Katz test.
70. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 385.
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of technological change.7 1 The Supreme Court has "failed to pursue
the implications of its insight," however.7 2 In a series of cases the Su-
preme Court has greatly narrowed Katz.7 -3 Either in reaction to the ex-
clusionary rule,7 4 or as an exercise in "double-think, ' 75 the Court has
whittled away at the Katz edifice until the case now seems limited to
its facts.
In the Katz decision, Justice Stewart wrote that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of fourth amendment protection. ' 76 In subsequent cases, the
Court has seized upon this "exposure" rule to fashion a doctrine that
has completely negated the effect of Katz. 7 7 The seminal case is United
71. Id. See also Ashdown, supra note 64, at 1321 (Katz represents the Supreme Court's
response to the new technological intrusiveness of an advanced society).
72. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L.J. 518, 540.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 77-113.
74. McMillan, Is There Anything Left of the Fourth Amendment?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. I
(1979).
75. Burkhoff, When is a Search not a Search? Fourth Amendment Doublethink? 15 U. TOL.
L. REV. 515 (1984).
76. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
77. The Court has limited Katz in other ways, too. Drivers/owners of cars have a reduced
expectation of privacy in their vehicles. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The police may conduct a warrant-
less search of a car if probable cause exists. See generally, Moylan, The Automobile Exception:
What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV.
987 (1976). Containers that might hold seizable items located within an automobile may be
searched if they are discovered during a permissible automobile search. United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982). In a related context, the Court held that a search incident to a lawful arrest can
extend to the entire passenger compartment of the automobile which includes "any object capable
of holding another object." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981). Passengers who
can claim no ownership or possessory rights in a vehicle in which they are riding may also be
searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Person must have a "legally sufficient" interest
in place to claim protection of fourth amendment. Defendants "asserted neither a property inter-
est nor a possessory interest" in the automobile or the property seized.). But see Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), where ownership of items seized was insufficient to raise any
fourth amendment issue. Because these cases discuss the automobile searches as exceptions to the
warrant requirement, they are beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, their effect on Katz
is significant because the "lesser expectation of privacy" analysis is an exception to the all or
nothing models of Katz. For a sharp criticism of the automobile exception in general and the Ross
case in particular, see Katz, United States v. Ross. Evolving Standards for Warrantless Searches,
74 J. CRIM. L. & C. 172 (1983).
Some personal attributes are also beyond the protection of the amendment. United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (forced voice exemplars did not violate fourth amendment); United
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplars did not violate fourth amendment). It
is an open question whether or not finger printing constitutes a search. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1.
But cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (detention without probable cause which in-
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States v. White. 8 In White, government agents sought to testify about
conversations between White and a bugged police informant which
they had simultaneously monitored. The question of the application of
the fourth amendment was critical. If monitoring the conversation was
a search then the testimony would have to be suppressed because the
government did not have a search warrant and no exception to the war-
rant clause applied.79 The Court held that the electronic monitoring
was not a fourth amendment search.8" The Court reasoned that Katz
left undisturbed several prior cases dealing with the use of informants,
both bugged and not.8" Thus, if a police informant:
[m]ay write down for official use his conversations with a defendant
and testify concerning them . . ., no different result is required if the
agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversa-
tions with the defendant either (1) simultaneously records them with
electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person, Lopez v.
cluded finger printing violates fourth amendment). Compare Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973) (fingernail scrapings constituted a search).
78. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). White was a plurality opinion authored by Justice White in which
the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Blackmun joined. Justice Black concurred in the re-
sult. Id. at 754. Given Justice Black's position in Katz, it is apparent that White is a relatively
libertarian position. The plurality in White is now cited as if it were a majority opinion. Compare
United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (opinion of White, J.); and United States v. Karo,
104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) in
which both Justices discuss the meaning of the White "rule."
79. 401 U.S. at 750.
80. Id. at 754.
81. The Court discussed the pre-Katz cases of Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
In Hoffa, the Court held that the fourth amendment did not prevent the use of an informant's
testimony at trial. Lewis similarly held that a police undercover officer who misrepresented his
identity while purchasing drugs from the defendant did not violate the fourth amendment. Lopez
held the fourth amendment was not violated by an informant who secretly taped conversations
with the defendant. For an incisive critique of these cases, including White, see Grano, supra note
47, at 432-38. Professor Weinreb has advanced the theory that the fourth amendment protects the
"privacy of place" and the "privacy of presence." Weinreb, supra note 2, at 69. Privacy of place
protects our property; privacy of presence protects our person when we are in a private place. Id.
Using this theory, Weinreb reconciles Katz and White saying that the defendant in Katz could
invoke the privacy of presence in the phone booth but the defendant in White couldn't invoke
either protection. Id. at 69 n.65. He concludes that Lewis was wrongly decided. Id. at 67. Under
Weinreb's analysis, Lewis clearly could invoke the privacy of presence because the transaction
occurred inside of his house. Id.
To the extent that the Supreme Court has created an enhanced zone of privacy when police
intrude upon a house, the Court has adopted Professor Weinreb's approach. Compare Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091 (1984) (court reluctant to find circumstances to justify warrantless
entry of home); and United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (warrantless beeper surveil-
lance in a private residence violates fourth amendment). See infra text accompanying notes 182-
212.
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United States; (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously
transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located
elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency.8 2
In short, the Court fashioned a syllogism for its rule in White:
Informants could testify to what they were told. Informants could use
tape recorders to record what they were told. Therefore, informants
could operate as radio transmitters of what they were told. As if to
answer criticism of the tautological nature of its rule, the White Court
immediately cast the case in privacy terms. According to the majority,
the critical question in the case was what expectations of privacy were
justifiable.83 Because the law allowed a defendant's expectation of pri-
vacy to be frustrated by the testimony of informants, it should similarly
allow an informant to simultaneously transmit conversations to third
parties. 84 But this formulation was simply the Court's earlier syllogism
now dressed in privacy clothes and equally misconceived.8 5
The White case introduced two other elements into the search
question; the first was a risk analysis. The Court said that "one con-
templating illegal activities" takes the risk that his cohorts will be po-
lice informers or turn state's evidence. If he doubted their trustworthi-
ness, he would not confide in them. "But if he has no doubts, or allays
them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his." 86
It is difficult to see what this analysis adds to the decision.87 The
court could have been saying that because these risks are inherent in
82. 401 U.S. at 751 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 752.
84. The Court stated:
[T]he law permits the frustration of actual expectations of privacy by permitting au-
thorities to use the testimony of those associates who for one reason or another have
determined to turn to the police, as well as authorizing the use of informants in the
manner exemplified by Hoffa and Lewis. If the law gives no protection to the wrong-
doer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect
him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are
later offered in evidence. ...
Id.
85. "Once informational privacy is recognized as an appropriate fourth amendment interest,
and once this interest is defined vis-a-vis the government, the voluntary disclosure rationale [in
White] breaks down." Grano, supra note 42, at 437. Grano argued that White and Hoffa were
inconsistent with Katz and should be overruled. Id. He suggested that Lewis might be an excep-
tion because the police activity did not trench upon any justifiable expectations of privacy. "To ask
someone to acknowledge wrongdoing . . . or to commit a crime does not seem to implicate privacy
at all. Id. But cf. Amsterdam, supra note 56 (system that restricts government's ability to physi-
cally search a house but not its ability to send spies into a house is irrational).
86. 401 U.S. at 752.
87. Amsterdam, supra note 56, "[Tjhe analysis of [cases like White] in terms of voluntary
assumption of the risk is wildly beside the point."
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illegal activities the defendant could not have had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy.88 But in the immediately preceeding paragraph the
Court dismissed as unimportant any subjective expectation on its way
to finding that case law dictates that any expectation in the case was
not justifiable. 9 As a separate rationale, risk analysis threatened to
swallow up the fourth amendment. If a criminal defendant were at his
risk when confiding in associates or if the risk caused him to lose his
privacy, then the fourth amendment would protect only hermits or peo-
ple who worked alone.90
The risk analysis may have been a way to support the Court's
holding that any expectation of privacy was not justified because of the
risk. But this begs the question.9 Moreover, the analysis left a number
of questions unanswered: How should the risk be measured? Is it the
same in each case?92 Does the degree of privacy depend on the nature
of the risk or, once risked, is all privacy lost? 93 In any event, risk analy-
sis will appear in later cases.9 4
Finally, the White case indicated the recurrent problem the Court
has in keeping its categories straight. The question in White was
whether or not the police activity was a search or seizure for the pur-
poses of the fourth amendment, not whether the search or seizure was
reasonable under the amendment. Yet the Court repeatedly lapsed into
a discussion of the reasonableness of the police conduct. It found no
difference between the bugged and the unbugged informant, "particu-
larly under the Fourth Amendment which is ruled by fluid concepts of
reasonableness." 95 The Court noted that it should not erect "constitu-
tional" barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also reliable
and that considerations like the accuracy and reliability of the evidence
"do not favor the defendant."9 Such considerations were immaterial if
88. Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 279.
89. "Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular
situations may be or the extent to which they may in fact have relied on the discretion of their
companions." 401 U.S. at 751.
90. Justice Harlan raised a more serious concern. He argued that if a person expected that
his or her conversations would be recorded "it [would] smother that spontaneity-reflected in
frivolous, impetuous, sacriligious and defiant discourse-that liberates daily life." Id. at 787. But
see Weinreb, supra note 2, at 68 (fourth amendment does not necessarily protect casual speech).
91. Dworkin, supra note 8.
92. Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping & The Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. REV. 831, 844
(1972) (suggesting that assuming "patent" risks consistent with Katz but not the "latent" risks
assumed in White).
93. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 254 (1971).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 100-13.
95. 401 U.S. at 753.
96. Id.
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the question is whether or not the police activity is a fourth amendment
search.9" Finally, the Court resorted to its twice used syllogism but this
time it appeared in reasonableness garb:
It is thus untenable to consider the activities and reports of the police
agent himself, though acting without a warrant, to be a "reasonable"
investigative effort and lawful under the Fourth Amendment but to
view the same agent with a recorder or transmitter as conducting an
"unreasonable" and unconstitutional search and seizure. 98
Considerations of reasonableness do not matter if the police activity is
not a search or seizure. As Judge Moylan has pointed out, "noncompli-
ance with a non-existent standard is an immateriality." 99
These three elements from White-its frustration of privacy syllo-
gism, its risk analysis, and its confusion of the threshold definitional
question with that of reasonableness-were used by the Court in sev-
eral later cases. For example, in United States v. Miller,10 u the Court
held that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
contents of his original checks and deposit slips because he "voluntarily
conveyed" the information contained in them to his bank.101 Citing
White, the Court explained that "[tlhe depositor takes the risk, in re-
vealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed to
the Government."102 Thus, the Court upheld the use of a subpoena to
acquire such records. 03
97. Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable v. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The
Neglected Threshold of "So What?", 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 75.
98. 401 U.S. at 753.
99. Moylan, supra note 97, at 82. Earlier in his article, Judge Moylan commented that gen-
erally, "we fall back upon the moral considerations and seek to inject them into the applicability
analysis even where they were utterly immaterial." Id. at 76. In a similar fashion, Professor Der-
showitz concluded that the question in White was "a question of moral justification. Bad people
are not morally justified in expecting privacy." Dershowitz, supra note 91, at 337. This moral
justification still finds its way into cases. Compare Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984)
(no societal interest in cultivating marijuana) and United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652
(1984) (no legitimate expectation of privacy in nature of cocaine when Congress proscribes private
possession).
100. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
101. Id. at 443.
102. Id.; cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (no fourth amendment interest in
tax records voluntarily conveyed to accountant).
103. Id. at 445. The Miller decision generated a great deal of criticism. For a sharp criticism
of Miller, see LAFAvE, supra note 21, § 2.7, at 411-17 (Miller result is "dead wrong" and its
effect "pernicicus"). See also Alschuler, supra note 64, at 22-23; Ashdown, supra note 64, at
1313; Note, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Bank Records: A Reappraisal of U.S. v.
Miller and Bank Depositor's Privacy Rights, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 243 (1981). Comment, A Bank
Customer Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of Bank Records: United States v. White
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 414 (1977). Apparently in response to the Miller decision, Congress
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Similarly in Smith v. Maryland,104 the Court held that the instal-
lation of a pen register was not a fourth amendment search because the
defendant had no privacy interest in the telephone numbers he di-
aled. 10 5 The White syllogism returned when the Court reasoned that a
telephone user lost his expectation of privacy if he conveyed the num-
ber he dialed to a live operator; therefore, no different result occurred
when the number was conveyed to electronic switching equipment. 10 6
These cases reveal the sterility of the White syllogism. Risk analy-
sis assumes that an individual has a choice whether or not to engage in
certain conduct. 07 Certainly, the defendants in White, Lewis, and
Hoffa could realistically choose what and how much to say to their
confidants and when to say it.'08 It is unrealistic, however, to assert
that people in the twentieth century have a choice whether or not to
open a checking account or to use the telephone. 09 Moreover, even if
we assume that there is a choice in these situations, however abstract,
it is preposterous to assert that one's privacy is totally destroyed be-
cause one "conveys" information to the bank teller or to the phone
company. In the case of the bank, the bank employees are only inter-
ested in the surface validity of the check and the sufficiency of funds in
passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp.
1979)). This act requires that notice of any federal subpoena or summons be given to the cus-
tomer and gives the customer an opportunity to challenge the subpoena or summons before any
records are turned over to the government. The Miller court implied that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank record because Congress required banks to keep
copies of transactions because of their usefulness in criminal investigations. 425 U.S. at 442-43.
This is clearly wrong. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 64, at 384 (government may not destroy right
to privacy by announcing pervasive surveillance).
104. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
105. Id. at 745-46.
106. The Court reasoned that:
When the petitioner used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical informa-
tion to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the
ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that processed
those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day,
personally completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had placed
his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We
[are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional] result is required because the
telephone company has decided to automate ...
Id. at 744.
107. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.7(c) at 415-16.
109. 442 U.S. 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting); LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 412. See also Fish-
man, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of Congressional
Intent, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 557, 573 (1980).
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the account on which it is drawn.110 It is highly unlikely that bank
employees make it a practice to ascertain to whom the check is written
and for what purpose, and the sheer volume of their work would make
it nearly impossible to later recall any individual transactions."1 The
same can be said for telephone operators. This contrasts sharply with
White where the informant engaged in conversations with the defen-
dant for the purpose of later testifying or where the police monitored
the conversations for the same purpose. In both instances, it was at
least realistic to expect the conversations to be recalled and, thus, plau-
sible that the participants lost any privacy in the conversations. On the
other hand, people who write checks realistically expose only a limited
amount of information to the bank.' Thus, their privacy should be
vitiated only to the extent to which such information is revealed. Nev-
ertheless, the Miller Court concluded that the hypothetical exposure of
the check to the banking system vitiated any expectation of privacy the
depositor had in it.' White and Miller sowed the seeds of Katz's de-
mise. Those seeds bore fruit in several recent cases. The Court resur-
rected the protected place rationale, destroyed the subjective prong of
the Katz test, and provided no guidance as to the factors to consider
under the objective prong of Katz. Underneath this chaos, however, the
Court silently used a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of
the police conduct." 4
III. THE RESURRECTION OF THE PROTECTED PLACE
Although the fourth amendment "protects people, not places,'11 15
the current Supreme Court seems intent on turning the statement
around. Several recent cases create a kind of fourth amendment "super
right" in the privacy of a home while denigrating personal privacy
under the amendment. Oliver v. United States"' is the first example of
this approach.
In Oliver the Supreme Court reaffirmed the open fields doctrine.
110. Note, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 YALE L.J. 1439 (1974).
Ill. Id. (thirty billion checks processed each year).
112. See California Banker's Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. The same criticism may be directed at Smith. See LAFAv E, supra note 21, at 110. See
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 749. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (those who disclose certain
facts to a bank or to a phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this
information will be released to other persons for other purposes).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 318-44.
115. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 751.
116. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
[Vol. 7:587
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The doctrine had its origins in Hester v. United States."7 In Hester,
revenue agents stationed outside the home of the defendant's father
saw the defendant pass a bottle to another person. The defendant and
his companion realized the agents were watching and took flight. In the
process, both men dropped the bottles." 8 The agents examined the bro-
ken bottles and found that they contained bootleg liquor.119 In an opin-
ion by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court held that no fourth amend-
ment search occurred even though the agents had committed a physical
trespass. According to the Court, "the special protection accorded by
the fourth amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers,
and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between
the latter and the house is as old as the common law.' ' 20
Courts interpret the open fields doctrine as a per se exception to
the fourth amendment.' 2' The critical question was whether or not the
area searched was within the curtilage of the dwelling. 22 If not, the
fourth amendment did not apply. 23
Katz cast doubt on the continuing vitality of the open fields rule,
however.124 The Katz decision rejected a fourth amendment jurispru-
dence based on property concepts. Instead, Katz called for an inquiry
into the nature of the privacy interest and the degree of surveillance. 2 5
The Katz opinion did not discuss its effect on Hester. 26 Thus,
lower courts hearing open fields cases had to decide if Katz silently
overruled Hester or if the open fields doctrine could be defended under
the new privacy analysis. 27 The only post-Katz Supreme Court deci-
117. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
118. Id. at 58.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 59.
121. See. e.g., Bedell v. State, 257 Ark. 895, 521 S.W.2d 200 (1975) (fourth amendment
does not apply to open fields and forest areas).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) (outer limits of curti-
lage defined by wall of remote outbuildings).
123. See, e.g., Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir. 1956) (car over 100 yards
from house not within curtilage).
124. Comment, Katz in the Open Fields: United States v. Oliver, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 485,
489 (1983).
125. LAFAvE, supra note 21, § 2.4, at 336 (1978).
126. Hester is mentioned twice in Katz. That the majority opinion cites it in a footnote indi-
cates that both parties agreed that open fields were not protected places. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351
n.8. Justice Harlan, however, cites Hester to distinguish an open field from the telephone booth in
Katz and to support his limited reading of the case's holding. Id. at 360.
127. Compare Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974) (defendant argued
that Katz sounded the "death knell" for open fields doctrine and "sub-silentio" overruled Hester)
and State v. Choart, 91 N.M. 584, 577 P.2d 892 (1978) (open fields cases analyzed pursuant to
Katz).
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sion arguably on point offered little help.12 Not surprisingly, the lower
courts were divided on this question12 0 until the Supreme Court at-
tempted to resolve the issue. Two such cases, Oliver v. United States
and Maine v. Thornton,30 were consolidated for decision.
In Oliver two narcotics agents of the Kentucky State Police went
to Oliver's farm to investigate reports that marijuana was being raised
on the property. The agents drove past Oliver's house until they came
to a locked gate with a no trespassing sign on it. They walked around
the gate and along a road for several hundred yards. When they passed
by a barn and a parked camper, someone shouted at them to stop. They
replied that they were state police officers. They approached the
camper but no one was present. The officers continued on and eventu-
ally found a field of marijuana located over a mile from the main
house.'
The district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence of the discovery of the fields by relying on a Katz privacy
analysis. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 132 The circuit
court found that Katz had not overruled the open fields doctrine.133
Moreover, the court noted that the open fields doctrine was compatible
with a privacy analysis because human relations that create the need
for privacy do not ordinarily take place in open fields and the owner's
common-law right of exclusion was insufficiently linked to fourth
amendment privacy.'34
In Maine v. Thornton, two police officers responded to an anony-
mous tip that marijuana was being grown on Thornton's property.
They entered the property on a foot path and followed this path until it
128. In Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), the
Court held that a state health inspector did not perform a fourth amendment search when he
entered the defendant's company and performed an air pollution test which required him to ob-
serve the smoke plumes emanating from the company's chimneys. Id. at 865. Although the Court
noted that the inspector's conduct fell within the "open fields" exception, it did so in the same
paragraph in which it noted that any invasion of privacy in either Hester or Western Alfalfa was
"abstract and theoretical." A privacy analysis is inconsistent with the per se rule of Hester. Thus,
Western Alfalfa can be interpreted to redefine Hester in Katz terms as easily as it can stand for
the continued vitality of a per se open fields exception.
129. Compare United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hester does not have
independent meaning) and United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1973) (mechanical
application of open fields exception).
130. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
131. Id. at 1738.
132. 686 F.2d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc) A panel of the Sixth Circuit had sustained
the district court's ruling. Oliver v. United States, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981).
133. 686 F.2d at 359.
134. Id. at 360.
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led them to two pastures of marijuana enclosed by chicken wire. When
the officers learned that the marijuana was located on Thornton's prop-
erty, they obtained a warrant to search the property and to seize the
marijuana. 138
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress and the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.13 6 The court limited the open
fields doctrine to situations where officers were lawfully present on
property and saw "open and patent" activity.13 7 Because that was
clearly not the case in Thornton, the only question to be answered was
whether or not the police activity violated "the privacy on which the
[defendant] justifiably relied."'' 38 Because the defendant made signifi-
cant efforts to conceal his activity and because the police trespassed
upon the defendant's property, the court found that the police activity
violated his right to privacy.' 39
The Supreme Court affirmed Oliver and reversed Thornton. Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the majority, advanced two separate arguments
to support the holding. First, he relied on the plain language of the
amendment to hold that "the government's intrusion into the open
fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed by the text
of the Amendment." 1 0 Quoting Justice Holmes in Hester, Powell con-
cluded that open fields were not "houses" as described in the amend-
ment.' 4 ' Moreover, the Court concluded that open fields were not "ef-
fects" within the meaning of the amendment.
Justice Powell advanced a second argument in support of the
Court's conclusion. Applying the Katz expectation of privacy test, the
Court concluded that "an individual has no legitimate expectation that
open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by government
officers." 2 Open fields do not provide the setting for the "intimate ac-
135. 104 S. Ct. at 1739.
136. State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
137. Id. at 495.
138. Id. at 493.
139. Id.
140. 104 S. Ct. at 1744.
141. "[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their
'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between
the latter and the house is as old as the common law." Id. at 1740 (citing Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. at 59). Moreover, the Court concluded that open fields were not effects within the mean-
ing of the amendment. The original draft of the amendment protected houses, papers and other
property but the final language contained the "less inclusive" phrase "effects," which the Framers
would have understood to be limited to personal but not real property. 104 S. Ct. at 1740 n.7.
142. Id. at 1742.
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tivities" protected by the amendment. 4" There is no societal interest in
protecting privacy of open fields activities like agriculture. 44 Moreover,
open fields are more accessible to the police and to the public than
homes or offices, 145 places which are protected by the amendment.
The Court dismissed the defendant's contention that the open
fields issue must be adjudicated on a case by case basis saying that
"police officers would have to guess before every search" whether land-
owners had posted enough signs or had taken steps sufficient to protect
their privacy. 14' The result would make it difficult for the police to dis-
cern the scope of their authority and create a danger of arbitrary and
inequitable enforcement of human rights.147
Justice Marshall dissented. 48 He argued that reliance on the plain
language was inconsistent with Katz and its progeny. According to the
dissent, a plain language theory dictated a different result in Katz be-
cause a telephone booth was not a "house" and a telephone conversa-
tion was not an "effect. 1 49 Justice Marshall went on to suggest an
analysis that looked at three factors to determine whether any expecta-
tion of privacy in open fields activities was reasonable: property rights
which arose from positive law, the use to which a place was put, and
whether the defendant had taken normal precautions to maintain his
privacy. 50  He concluded that although no one factor should
predominate, a balanced assessment of all three would lead to an easily
applied rule: "Private land marked in a fashion sufficient to render en-
try thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the state in which the
land lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscription of un-
reasonable searches and seizures."'5
In response to Justice Marshall's contention that positive law
should play a part in the analysis, the majority noted that the law of
trespass and the fourth amendment protect different interests. 5 '
Whereas trespass protects an owner's right to possession and control
143. Id. at 1741. But see 104 S. Ct. at 1748 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (open fields and for-
ests can be used for solitary walks, agricultural business, lover's trysts, worship services etc.).
144. Id. at 1741.
145. Id. Compare Oliver, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984); and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980) (home); and G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (office).
146. 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
147. Id. See LaFave, Case by Case Adjudication versus Standardized Procedures: The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127.
148. 104 S. Ct. at 1744. He was joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
149. Id. at 1745.
150. Id. at 1747.
151. Id. at 1750.
152. Id. at 1744.
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the fourth amendment protects the owner's privacy rights.153 Trespass
goes far beyond the fourth amendment to protect intrusions which have
nothing to do with the owner's privacy.15 4
Both of the Court's rationales point to a clear rule. Police investi-
gations of the "open fields" are not searches, and therefore do not come
within the ambit of the fourth amendment. 55 In drawing this "bright-
line" the Court satisfies an on-going criticism of its fourth amendment
jurisprudence.' 56 Bright line rules are not ends in themselves, however.
Bright lines cannot be drawn arbitrarily. They must provide guidance
to the police while at the same time advance the protections of the
fourth amendment.' 57 With so much at stake, the Court must take care
in drawing the line so that the results are not "out of all proportion to
153. Id.
154. Id. But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350-51, where the Court noted that
fourth amendment security often has nothing to do with privacy at all. See also Posner, The
Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 173.
155. The Court's reaffirmation of the Open Fields rule does not clarify the serious defini-
tional problems inherent in the doctrine. See LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.4 at 332 n.6-13 citing
examples of expansive reading of the words "open fields." The Court ignored reality in its asser-
tion that the curtilage will be clearly marked, and that the concept is easily understood. 104 S. Ct.
at 1742. Cf. Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of" Property Concepts in
Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 5 (1971) ("The protection guar-
anteed citizens 'houses' under the Fourth Amendment must be intended to extend beyond the
dimensions of the improvements upon this land. Otherwise, distinctions must be made among
closed porches, open porches, terraces, enclosed tennis courts and lawns. ). A full discussion
of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, however.
156. See, e.g., LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PiTT. L. REV. 307 (1982); LaFave, supra note 146; Dworkin,
supra note 8 (1973).
157. LaFave, supra note 155, at 325-26. To be precise, Professor LaFave would test a
"Bright Line" by asking four questions:
(I) Does it have clear and certain boundaries, so that it in fact makes case-by-case
evaluation and adjudication unnecessary? (2) Does it produce results approximating
those which would be obtained if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying
principle were practicable? (3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case
application of a principle because that principle has proved unworkable? (4) Is it not
readily subject to manipulation and abuse?
Id. The Oliver rule fails on all four counts. First, the amorphous concept of the "curtilage" will
keep courts busy for years searching for its boundaries. Second, the facts in Oliver and Thornton
show that proper application of the underlying principle of privacy would produce a different
result. Third, there is no apparent need to forego case-by-case analysis in the open field situations
that is also not applicable to other fourth amendment situations. Although the Oliver Court does
not suggest that the whole area of fourth amendment law be transformed into a collection of
bright lines, the results in the cases show movement by the Court in that direction. Compare
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (fourth amendment not applicable in a prison). Too
many rules can be as bad as too few. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45
U. PiTT. L. REV. 227 (1984).
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the differences between cases lying close on either side. .... ,"5' The
placement of the line in Oliver seems to be founded more on a desire to
convict drug traffickers than on fourth amendment principles.
The Court's plain language rationale is inconsistent with Katz.
The Katz decision rejected a literal interpretation of the amendment. 59
Justice Black gathered no support for his argument that the language
of the amendment did not cover a telephone call or a telephone
booth.'6 0 That the Katz Court did not try to locate the telephone call or
booth within the strict language of the amendment was not accidental
given the privacy rationale advanced by the case.
The majority noted that post-Katz cases frequently relied on the
language of the amendment to delineate its scope.'6 1 Thus, the majority
reasoned that Katz did not sever fourth amendment doctrine from the
amendment language.16 2 But this only stated a truism. Without a
doubt, structures used as houses are still "houses" under the fourth
amendment while items of personal property are still "effects." The
cases cited by the Court only reaffirm the basic notion.' 63 When a
house or a person is searched the issue of the scope of the fourth
amendment coverage is easy. Katz, however, was not an easy case. The
rule in Katz was intended to apply to the easy as well as the hard cases
when reliance on the language of the fourth amendment provided little
guidance. In these instances, Katz required courts to look deeper into
the amendment at its core value: Whether, if the surveillance practiced
by the police were permitted to go unregulated by constitutional re-
straints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens
would have been diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of
158. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 388.
159. "[W]e have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements .. " Katz, 385 U.S. at
353. In so holding, the Court rejected the rationale in Olmstead that the amendment only pro-
tected tangible items.
160. Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black had two objections to the
majority opinion. First, he did not believe the words of the amendment could include electronic
eavesdropping. Id. at 366. He cited Olmstead in support of this conclusion. Id. at 367. Second,
and following from his first point, he did not believe it was the proper role of the Court to "re-
write" the Amendment to make it conform to modern technology. Id. at 365. Justice Black's
unyielding literalism is identical to Justice Powell's literalism in Oliver.
161. 104 S. Ct. at 1740 n.6.
162. Id.
163. Id. The Court cited three cases: Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (opinion of
Stewart, J.) (containers found in car are effects); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
(warrantless entry of a house improper without probable cause in exigent circumstances); and
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (homeowner's rights violated by warrantless
entry to install electronic listening device).
610 [Vol. 7:587
FOURTH AMENDMENT
a free and open society. 1 4 In short, Katz did not divorce the amend-
ment from its language, nor did it perform a shotgun wedding.
Justice Marshall was probably correct when he predicted that the
plain language rationale would have little effect on fourth amendment
law.16 5 Nevertheless, the ease with which six members of the Court
accepted this rationale is disturbing.
The second rationale for the decision advanced by the Court was
also flawed. The court ignored the sensitive inquiry called for by Katz
and simply transformed the per se open fields rule from Hester into a
per se rule of nonprivacy. The Court began by rephrasing Hester in
privacy terms. According to the majority, the rule in Hester can be
seen to stand for the proposition that an individual may not legiti-
mately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors, except for
the area immediately surrounding the home. 16 This squared with the
Court's understanding of the intent of the framers to keep certain en-
closures, like the home, free from arbitrary governmental invasion.'" 7
Noting that "open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the amendment is intended to shelter," the Court con-
cluded that any expectation of privacy in open fields was not an expec-
tation that society recognized as reasonable. 68
The Court found support for its conclusion by comparing the ac-
tivities protected by the amendment and those which occured in the
open fields.'6 9 The Court asserted that there was no societal interest in
protecting the privacy of activity conducted in open fields, such as the
cultivation of crops. No explanation was offered why society would
have been willing to protect white-collar businesses but not
agriculture.17 0
Instead, the Court treated these differences as self-evident. It may
be that because agriculture is performed out of doors it is not protected
by the fourth amendment. This focus does not address the question,
however. It is not solely where an activity takes place but what expec-
tations of privacy about that activity are reasonable. The defendant in
Katz, for instance, made a call from a public telephone booth. He was
164. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 403.
165. 104 S. Ct. at 1746 n.7. But see Justice White's concurrence in Oliver. 104 S. Ct. at
1744 ("however reasonable a landowner's expectations of privacy may be, those expectations can-
not convert a field into a 'house' or an 'effect' ").
166. 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Compare G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
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visible to passersby. Moreover, a casual eavesdropper easily could have
overheard his conversations. Neither of these factors are present, of
course, when a person makes a phone call from his or her home. But
the Katz court rejected the government's argument along those lines.17 1
To further support its distinction between houses (and offices) and
open fields, the Court noted that "as a practical matter, the latter are
accessible to the public and the police in ways that the former are
not." 1 72 The Court relied on two propositions; first, fences and no tres-
passing signs do not bar the public from viewing open fields generally,
and second, the police may conduct aerial surveillance of open fields. 73
The Court might have been correct in its first assertion depending
on the field. If a marijuana farmer planted his crop in a field along side
a road, he could not expect a no trespassing sign (nailed to a tree) and
a locust pole fence to prevent a passerby from seeing his field. Indeed,
this situation would fall squarely within the Katz "knowing exposure"
principle.17 4 But these images of fields of marijuana openly visible from
a country road are in sharp contrast with the facts in Oliver and
Thornton. The marijuana patches were not visible in either case from
any land-based point except at the site of the patches.1 75 It does not
follow that because the police would not have been conducting a search
if they had observed a field of marijuana planted near the road, that
they will never conduct a search when they go looking for a field
planted in an area away from and not visible from the road.176
The Court's use of the possibility of aerial surveillance 77 to sup-
171. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
172. 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
173. Id.
174. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 389 U.S. at 351.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 249-50.
176. A court would not accept an argument that the police could conduct a warrantless
search of dwelling absent probable cause and exigent circumstances because the dwelling was
located in a high crime area and, therefore, neighborhood residents were not deterred from unlaw-
fully entering the dwelling or that criminal activity could have been seen if it had been conducted
near an unshuttered window. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 64, at 406-07 (When a car is parked in
a high crime area "does that mean government agents can break into [the] car uncontrolled by
the Fourth Amendment?").
177. For a general discussion of aerial surveillance and the fourth amendment, see Comment,
Aerial Surveillance: A Plane View of the Fourth Amendment, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 307 (1983),
Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 409
(1982). State and federal courts have adopted several different approaches to resolving the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of aerial searches. Compare United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp.
1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (open fields one factor to consider in evaluating constitutionality of
aerial surveillance); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
833 (1981) (no subjective expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance in area routine Coast
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port the intrusion on the property is similarly flawed. Moreover, it adds
a potentially dangerous element to the fourth amendment equation. It
is simply not true that because the government has the means to ac-
quire certain information without raising any fourth amendment
problems it may therefore use a different means to acquire the same
information. 7 ' Such an exception would swallow the fourth amend-
ment. Moreover, the potential success of a particular investigative tech-
nique is immaterial when it is not utilized. What matters is the intru-
siveness of the technique used in the context of the particular case at
hand. 79 Although the Court's conclusion is quite clear throughout, the
analysis is less than convincing. By substituting assertion for analysis
the Court leaves the impression that it is more interested in attaining
convictions than it is in constitutional rights.18 0 As Justice Marshall
pointed out in dissent, by creating a per se exception to the fourth
amendment the Court "opens the way to investigative activities we
would all find repugnant."'' The greatest danger in this course is that
the people, once exposed to such activity, will become insensitive to its
threat to freedom.182
The Court's analysis in Oliver was essentially this syllogism: the
framers protected houses, this activity occurred outside the house,
Guard flights); and Dean v. Superior Court for County of Nevada, 35 Cal. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr.
585 (1973) (common habits of mankind in use of property dictate reasonableness of expectations
of privacy; growing contraband not consistent with such common habits). See generally Annot.,
56 A.L.R. FED. 772 (1982).
178. For example, the ability of the police to bug a participant in a conversation does not
thereby allow the police to bug the place where the conversation occurs or the device over which it
is transmitted without the consent of one of the participants. Compare U.S. v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971) and Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (rights of homeowner violated
when police make warrantless entry, installation, and monitoring of electronic listening device).
179. Cf United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
[We] have never held that potential as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. A holding to that effect would mean
that a policeman walking down the street carrying a parabolic microphone capable of
picking up conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a search even if the
microphone were not turned on. It is the exploitation of technological advances that
implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.
Id. at 3302.
180. "The Burger Court often acts, in its resolution of fourth amendment issues . .. as
much like an overzealous police department, as it does like a court. It quite clearly sees its preemi-
nent role in criminal cases as that of insuring that criminals go to jail." Burkhoff, supra note 75,
at 557 (1984).
181. 104 S. Ct. at 1751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment serves as the ultimate limitation on state police practices but its usefulness is limited.
See supra note 23.
182. 104 S. Ct. at 1751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. at 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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therefore, the fourth amendment did not protect this activity. This
same syllogism undergirds the decision in United States v. Karo.18a In
Karo, an agent learned that Karo and two other men had ordered 50
gallons of ether from a government informant. The ether was to be
used to extract cocaine from clothing imported into this country. The
government received a court order allowing the installation and moni-
toring of an electronic beeper. 184 With the consent of the informant, the
government substituted a can containing the beeper for one of the cans
in the intended shipment.1 85
Drug Enforcement Agency agents saw Karo pick up the ether and,
by using a combination of visual and beeper surveillance, followed
Karo to his house. Later, the beeper allowed them to determine that
the can was still in the house. Subsequently, beeper surveillance alone
allowed the agents to detect the can's movement to and presence within
two other houses as well as to two different commercial storage facili-
ties. Finally, the agents observed a defendant and another person re-
moving the cans from the second storage facility. a6
Again using visual and beeper surveillance, DEA agents traced the
can to a third house. Because the agents were afraid of being detected,
they did not maintain close surveillance of the house. Instead, they
later verified the presence of the can in the house by beeper surveil-
lance. 187 Armed with this and other information, the agents sought and
received a search warrant for the premises. The warrant was executed,
cocaine and laboratory equipment were seized, and the defendants were
arrested. 88
The district court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the
evidence on the grounds that the initial warrant used to install the
beeper was invalid, thus the later warrant to search the house was
tainted by this prior illegality.1 89 The United States appealed but did
not challenge the invalidation of the first warrant. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that a warrant was required for both the installation
183. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
184. "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals
that can be picked up by a radio receiver." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
185. 104 S. Ct. at 3300.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 3301. Five defendants were indicted for conspiring to possess cocaine with the
intent to distribute and also with the underlying offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
846. One defendant was indicted only for conspiracy. 104 S. Ct. at 3301.
189. 104 S. Ct. at 3301.
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and the monitoring of a beeper. 190
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice White, the
Court held that no fourth amendment question was raised by the in-
stallation of the beeper because the can into which it was installed was
owned by the DEA.191 Moreover, even if the beeper had been installed
in a can from the original shipment no fourth amendment interests
were implicated because the owner of the shipments consented. 92 The
Court reasoned that any infringement of fourth amendment privacy oc-
curred during the monitoring of the beeper. On this point the Court
held that the fourth amendment was violated by the warrantless moni-
toring of the beeper when it was located within a private residence.1 93
Justice White reasoned that private residences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy and that expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.1 94 By monitoring the
beeper while it was inside a private residence the agents obtained infor-
mation they could not have obtained by observation from outside the
house. This contrasts with United States v. Knotts where the informa-
tion revealed by beeper surveillance was "voluntarily conveyed to any-
one who wanted to look. .... -195 In Karo, however, the beeper re-
vealed "a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the
Government . . . could not have otherwise obtained without a war-
rant." 196 In spite of this holding, the Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals. After striking all of the improperly obtained information
from the affidavit for the second warrant, the court found enough un-
tainted information left to furnish probable cause for the issuance of
190. United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1983).
191. 104 S. Ct. at 3301.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 3303.
194. Id.
195. 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). In Knotts, government agents placed a beeper in a drum of
chloroform, a precursor chemical used to manufacture illegal drugs. By monitoring the beeper
after it was purchased, the agents were able to follow the drum to the defendant's house. The
Court found that no search occurred because monitoring the beeper did not invade any reasonable
expectations of privacy:
A person traveling . over the public streets . . . voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direc-
tion, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he
exited from public roads onto private property.
Id. at 281-282. The Court relied on Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, for its conclusion. 460 U.S.
at 283. For a discussion critical of the decision in Knotts see LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagar-
ies (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew),
74 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1171, 1174-78 (1983).
196. 104 S. Ct. at 3304.
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the second warrant. 197
The results in Karo and Knotts cannot be reconciled unless one
resurrects the sterile and formalistic concept of protected places. Pro-
fessor LaFave argues that Knotts was wrongly decided because anyone
who observed the can in which the beeper was located would not have
known what the beeper revealed: that a container purchased in one lo-
cation was on its way to another location. 198 Only a hypothetical "army
of bystanders" located along the route who passed their observations
from one to another could have known all that the government knew
from its surveillance of the beeper.199 LaFave concludes that "[t]he
Court has thus continued farther down the same path as in Smith v.
Maryland," significantly the prior decision most relied upon in Knotts.
By similar analysis, even the facts of the Katz case itself could be char-
acterized as not involving a search "because a lipreader or a bystander
could detect what was being said."200 Hypothetical observers could also
have followed the box in the house had they been present or near
enough to a window to see inside.20 1
Justice O'Connor pointed out that the electronic transmission from
inside the house did not by itself constitute a search. 20 2 White estab-
lished that either a person assumes a risk that his conversations will be
revealed, or that any privacy in the conversation evaporates when one
confides in another. 20 3 Neither of the factors is present when a person
197. Id. at 3306-07. Justice O'Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Id.
at 3307. She saw the privacy interests implicated by the beeper surveillance to be much narrower
than the majority. To her, the "touchstone" would be "the defendant's interest in the
container .. " If the defendant owned the containers or exercised exclusive dominion and con-
trol over them then he would have a privacy interest in their location within his home. But if the
defendant allowed someone else's containers to come into his home, then he would surrender any
expectation of privacy in their location within his home. Id. at 3308-09. Because of this, Justice
O'Connor would allow a challenge to beeper evidence only if "the beeper was monitored when
visual tracking of the container was not possible" and "the defendant had an interest in the
container itself sufficient to empower him to give effective consent to a search of the container."
Id. at 3310.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the Court's reasoning
concerning the in-house monitoring of the beeper but disagreed with the majority's de novo review
of the warrant application. Id. at 3314.
198. LaFave, supra note 194, at 1176.
199. Id. at 1176-77.
200. Id. at 1177. 1 would add Miller and White to Professor LaFave's list even though the
Court did not cite it. Knotts is a further application of the White syllogism. See supra text accom-
panying notes 82-85.
201. Compare Cohen v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970); and
State v. Clarke, 242 So. 2d 791 (Fla. App. 1970).
202. 104 S. Ct. at 3307. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 86-94.
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voluntarily opens his or her house to a closed container.2""
The Court distinguished the participant monitoring cases by say-
ing that those cases relied on the consent of one of the parties to the
conversation. The risk assumed by the homeowner was that his guest
consented to have the conversation taped. The homeowner did not as-
sume the risk of any non-consensual bugging. By the same token, the
homeowner did not assume the risk that property brought into the
home was bugged.20 5 Moreover, the Court noted that "[there would be
nothing left of the fourth amendment right to privacy if anything that
a hypothetical government informant might reveal is stripped of consti-
tutional protection."20 Neither of these statements adequately justified
the distinction drawn by the Court.
It is not clear that the risks are different enough to justify different
results. Indeed, the nature of the intrusion in the participant monitor-
ing cases is qualitatively different than in the beeper case. By bugging
another person, the government invades a personal relationship; by
monitoring a beeper the government learns the location of an item. The
former seems more intrusive on privacy than the latter. 0 7 Moreover,
the information gathered by beeper surveillance in a house is not much
different than what the police already know. 208 Finally, the Court's
grand statement about the fourth amendment is inconsistent with
Smith and Miller. The hypothetical telephone operator or bank teller
were the bench-marks by which the Court measured the defendant's
expectations of privacy. 209 Those cases differ from Karo in that at some
point telephone company switching equipment processed the calls in
204. Cf. 104 S. Ct. at 3308 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). "When a
closed container is moved by permission into a home, the homeowner . . . surrender[s] any expec-
tation of privacy .. .in the movements of the container-unless it is their container or under
their dominion and control." (emphasis in original).
205. 104 S. Ct. at 3304.
206. Id.
207. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (third party bug-
ging undermines the confidence and sense of security characteristic of individual relationships
between citizens in a free society); Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 407:
Both [spying and electronic surveillance] tend to repress crime in the same way, by
making people distrustful and unwilling to talk to one another. The only difference is
that under electronic surveillance you are afraid to talk to anybody in your office or
over the phone, while under a spy system you are afraid to talk to anybody at all.
208. If the police can monitor the beeper as it moves about in public, then they will be able
to follow it up to the defendant's front door. United States v.Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). At this
point, the police know who has the container and the building in which it is located. To follow it
anywhere else, they simply need to turn on the monitor whenever someone leaves the building. In
Knotts, for example, the beeper was followed to several different locations. 460 U.S. at 281.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
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Smith or a bank employee handled the checks in Miller but these are
distinctions without a difference. In neither Smith nor Miller could the
government point to a person who actually and not hypothetically could
recall either the telephone numbers or the information on the checks.
The decision in Karo can only be explained by reference to the
doctrine of protected places. For example, the syllogism from Oliver is
applied with alarming simplicity. The beeper could be monitored
outside of the defendant's house but could not be monitored once the
item which contained the beeper passed the threshold of the house. Ac-
cording to the majority opinion, the Court's fourth amendment search
and seizure cases "have not deviated from [the] basic principle" that
the expectation of privacy in a private residence is reasonable.2 0 Jus-
tice White compared monitoring the beeper to an agent's warrantless
entry into the house to verify the precise location of a certain item. The
fourth amendment protects people from a warrantless intrusion of this
kind. Thus, the result should be the "same where, without a warrant,
the government surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain
information that it could not have obtained by observation outside the
curtilage of the house."21 ' Because monitoring the beeper revealed a
"critical fact about the interior of the premises," it was a search and a
warrant was required. 12
The reasoning and results in Knotts and Karo resembled decisions
made under a protected place theory. 13 Just as in Silverman where the
spikemike penetrated the wall of the home and thus violated the fourth
amendment, the radio waves in Karo penetrated the boundaries of the
house, similarly invalidating any information acquired. By comparison,
Knotts, like Goldman, defined the police activity as being outside of the
amendment when that activity did not break the boundary of the home.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that an expectation
of privacy in a house is reasonable. Some reference to place is inevita-
ble in a fourth amendment analysis. It is when reference to place be-
comes a talisman that the teaching of Katz is ignored. Unfortunately,
the Court's decisions this term used place as a talisman. For example,
in Hudson v. Palmer21 4 the Court ruled that the fourth amendment did
210. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. The result in Karo is consistent with Professor Weinreb's proposed theory of the fourth
amendment because in-the-house monitoring of the beeper violates both the "privacy of place"
and the "privacy of presence" which the defendant enjoyed. Weinreb, supra note 2.
214. 104 S. Ct. 3194, (1984). In two previous cases the Court hinted at this holding. See
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), where the Court upheld a conviction on other grounds
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not apply inside a prison though the "papers and effects" of a prisoner
were searched. If the protection of the fourth amendment turned on
something other than place, Hudson would have been wrong. The deci-
sion established that prisons were not protected places.
Palmer, an inmate at the Bland Correctional Center in Bland, Vir-
ginia, brought a pro se action in federal district court claiming that
Hudson, a corrections officer, conducted an unreasonable "shake down"
search of his cell in violation of the fourth amendment.2 15 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Hudson.2 16 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court on the fourth
amendment issue holding that an individual prisoner had a limited
fourth amendment right to privacy in his cell."' According to the cir-
cuit court, shakedown searches were permissible only if "done pursuant
to an established program of conducting random searches of single cells
or groups of cells reasonably designed to deter or discover the posses-
sion of contraband" or upon the reasonable belief that the particular
prisoner possessed contraband."1 8
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on this issue. In
an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court adopted a "bright line"
rule that prisoners had no legitimate expectation of privacy in their
individual cells, thus, the fourth amendment was not applicable in a
prison context.21 9 The Court balanced the interests of society in the
security of its penal institutions against the interest of the prisoner in
the privacy of his cell. 2 0 Because the right to privacy was necessarily
circumscribed by the fact of incarceration and because institutional se-
curity was central to all of the corrections goals, the Court struck the
but declared that "a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an
office, or a hotel room." Id. at 143; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), where the Court as-
sumed a diminished expectation of privacy but upheld shakedown searches, strip searches, and
body cavity searches of pre-trial detainees. See also Block v. Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984)
(random shakedown searches of absent pre-trial detainee's cell do not violate the due process
clause of fourteenth amendment). See generally Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and
Seizures: "Locking" the fourth amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REV. 1045
(1976).
215. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197. Palmer also claimed that Hudson intentionally destroyed
items of personal property thereby depriving him of property without due process of law. The
Court found that the holding and the rationale of Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) should
apply to intentional deprivation of property. 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
216. 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
217. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1983).
218. Id. at 1224. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision denying Palmer's
due process claim. Id. at 1223.
219. 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
220. Id. at 3200.
1984]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
balance in favor of institutional security.221
In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Burger cited statistics
showing the violent nature of prison life.222 In addition, the Chief Jus-
tice noted the problem prison administrators had in stopping the flow of
drugs, weapons, and other contraband into prisons. Because the only
place where a prisoner could hide contraband was in his cell, the Chief
Justice concluded that prison officials must have unfettered access to a
prisoner's cell. 223 The Court went on to say that the uncertainty of ran-
dom searches was a potent weapon against "the proliferation of knives
and guns, illicit drugs, and other contraband." ' 4 The court of appeals'
requirement that random searches be carried out according to some
established plan would "seriously undermine the effectiveness of the
weapon."22
Palmer conceded the utility of routine shakedowns but contended
that the fourth amendment protected him from searches designed only
to harass. Chief Justice Burger recognized the evil of harassment
searches but refused to consider the question:
This argument [against harassment searches], which assumes the an-
swer to the predicate question whether a prisoner has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his prison cell at all, is merely a challenge to
the reasonableness of the particular search of respondent's cell. Be-
cause we conclude that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of
privacy and that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches does not apply in prison cells, we need not address this
issue. 22 1
The result in Palmer can only be explained by reference to the
221. "A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompat-
ible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institu-
tional security and internal order." Id. at 3201.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion agreeing substantially with the majority on this
issue. Id. at 3205. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion dissenting from the majority's fourth amend-
ment holding. Id. at 3207. Calling the majority's reasoning "seriously flawed-indeed, internally
inconsistent". Id. at 3208. Stevens criticized the Court's adoption of a "bright-line rule." Id. at
3215.
222. The Chief Justice noted that during 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120
prisoners murdered, 29 riots, and 125 suicides. Id. at 3200. But see the dissenting opinion of
Stevens, J., showing that the homicide rate in prisons is lower than in Miami, New York, and the
District of Columbia. Id. at 3214. Justice Stevens cautioned that his statistics did not provide a
standard for measuring reasonableness but rather showed that the Court's use of statistics was
"less than persuasive." Id.
223. Id. at 3200.
224. Id. at 3201.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 3202.
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apparent "super privacy" of the home. A plain language rationale sup-
ports Palmer's claim because without a doubt the items searched were
"paper or effects." If so, then the fourth amendment should apply. The
Court would never so readily countenance a warrantless search of a
home. As in Oliver, however, because the activity occurs outside the
home the defendant is not entitled to any privacy.
The weight which the Court gave to the defendant's interest in its
balancing test also indicated the degree to which personal interests are
devalued in the Court's "nostalgic devotion to the hearth. 22 7 The
Court described Palmer's privacy interests as necessarily circumscribed
by prison life. This is true as a general proposition, yet even a prisoner
has a much greater specific, personal interest in protecting the privacy
of personal letters and papers.228 The Court, however, did not take
these interests into account in its balancing test and in fact completely
rejected any consideration of them.229 The Court is saying that the
fourth amendment protects places, and a prison or an open field or a
public highway is not one of those places.230
IV. DEATH OF THE SUBJECTIVE PRONG OF THE KATZ
TEST
The search cases of the 1983-84 term confirmed what had long
been suspected: the subjective prong of the Katz privacy test was
dead.2 31 That portion of the Katz test never was valued highly by the
227. "By focusing on the sanctity of the home rather than on the broader privacy interest,
the majority invited speculation that it is motivated more by a nostalgic devotion to the hearth
than by a commitment to the Fourth Amendment." The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 75, 187 (1980).
228. See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (reading prisoner's pri-
vate papers during search for contraband not justified without nexus between papers and govern-
ment interest in security). Compare United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973)
(court required a showing of governmental interest in monitoring prisoners' mail) and Sumlin v.
State, 266 Ark. 709, 587 S.W.2d 571 (1979) (detection of escape plans sufficient governmental
interest to screen all mail to and from prisoners).
229. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
230. I am not arguing that prison searches should be subject to strict fourth amendment
requirements. Prison searches differ in quality from other searches if for no other reason than that
they occur in prison where the inmate's liberty is greatly circumscribed and the government's
interest in security is great. Balancing these interests is a difficult task. See LAFAvE, supra note
21, § 10.9. My complaint about Hudson is that the Court casually dismissed the fourth amend-
ment claim without any recognition of the complexity of the question. The Court's analysis is so
superficial that, in my view, it is nothing more than a simplistic protected place rationale.
231. I am not the first person to reach this conclusion. Burkoff, supra note 75, at 528; Note,
Protecting Privacy under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313, 328 (1981); Note, A Recon-
sideration of the Katz Test, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 154, 162 (1977); Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 56,
384 (1974). But cf. Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REV.
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Court232 and in recent years was often dropped from the citation of the
expectation of privacy test.2 3 During this same period of time, how-
ever, other cases reverted to the classic two-pronged Katz test.2 34 The
most recent cases should put the subjective prong to rest for good.
From the beginning, the subjective prong created problems for
fourth amendment analysis. In the first place, the formulation of the
test was in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, an opinion
which he later repudiated.235 It was difficult to determine the proper
scope of the subjective prong. Professor Amsterdam pointed out that if
a subjective expectation of privacy were a necessary condition to fourth
amendment privacy, then the protections of the fourth amendment
would evaporate with the government's announcement of pervasive sur-
veillance. 236 On the other hand, a subjective expectation of privacy
could not be a sufficient condition, for then every warrantless search
not covered by an existing exception would be defeated by the defen-
335, 361 (1978), suggesting that the Court looks for the actual expectations of contemporary
Americans. Professor Yackle criticized this approach because it would allow fourth amendment
protection to vary "with the ebb and flow of public opinion." Id. Later cases, however, indicated
that the actual expectations of privacy held by Americans was immaterial. Only the expectations
of five Supreme Court justices mattered. Cf Ashdown, supra note 72.
232. Compare United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), where the Court did not discuss
the bank depositor's subjective expectation of privacy in his bank records and Burrows v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (1974), where the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court used the defendant's expectation of privacy in bank records as the fourth
amendment standard.
233. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3323 (1980) ("The Fourth
Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy."); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,
93 (1980) (illegal search only violates the rights of those who have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-43 (1979).
235. In his dissenting opinion to United States v. White, 401 U.S. 245, Justice Harlan said
fourth amendment analysis must "transcend the search for subjective expectations. 401
U.S. at 786.
236. "An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement
of what Katz held or in a theory of what the Fourth Amendment protects. It can
neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to Fourth
Amendment protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjec-
tive expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984
was being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under
comprehensive electronic surveillance."
Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 384. But see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), where
the Court held that the Bank Secrecy Act created no legitimate expectation of privacy because
financial records are useful in criminal investigations. Cf. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness
for searches and seizures in industries with long histories of pervasive regulation); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, (1972) (inspection for compliance with Gun Control Act a limited threat to
privacy because of dealer's knowledge of pervasive governmental regulation).
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dant's assertion that he expected to keep private what the government
seized.
The Court rarely addressed the question of the relationship of the
two prongs to each other. In Smith v. Maryland,23 7 however, Justice
Blackmun analyzed at some length the subjective claim of privacy. In
Smith, the Court held that a pen register which recorded the numbers
dialed by the defendant was not a search for fourth amendment pur-
poses. In the first part of the opinion the Court discussed the defen-
dant's claim of subjective privacy. Justice Blackmun noted that the de-
fendant's expectation of privacy could extend only to the contents of his
calls and not to the numbers he dialed. 38 He concluded that telephone
users knew they conveyed the numbers they dialed to the telephone
company because their calls had to be transmitted through telephone
company switching equipment. 3 9 In addition, users knew the phone
company recorded these numbers because they received a list of calls in
their monthly bills. Finally, telephone users knew that the phone com-
pany recorded these numbers for a variety of business purposes. 240 The
Court concluded that it was "too much to believe" that telephone users
in general had any expectation of privacy in the numbers they di-
aled.2 4' The Court went on to reject the defendant's claim that his pri-
vacy was enhanced because he made the telephone calls in question
from his home. "[T]he site of the call is immaterial for purposes of
analysis in the case. . . . Regardless of his location, petitioner had to
convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same
way. . . 4
The exact rationale for this holding is unclear. At one level, the
Court seemed to mount an attack on the credibility of the defendant's
claim of a subjective expectation of privacy.24 3 On the other hand, the
Court seemed to be measuring the defendant's actual expectation of
privacy by reference to an objective standard.244
237. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
238. Id. at 742.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 743.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. "Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to be-
lieve that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that
the numbers they dial will remain secret." Id.
244. The Court seemed to conclude that Smith had no subjective expectation of privacy be-
cause -[t]elephone users ... typically know that they must convey numerical information to the
phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information . I. " d. See also Burkhoff, supra note 75.
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This latter reading of Smith was inconsistent with Katz because
Katz asked whether the defendant had an "actual" expectation of pri-
vacy or, as the majority put it, whether the individual sought "to pre-
serve something as private. '245 Katz did not measure the defendant's
expectations of privacy against any general user profile. The better
reading of Smith was the former. Of course, this did little to clarify the
significance of the subjective prong. The Court proceeded to an analysis
of the objective prong of the Katz test-whether society viewed the
claimed privacy as reasonable. The discussion seems unnecessary if a
subjective expectation is a necessary condition to fourth amendment
protection. If a defendant has no expectation of privacy then it matters
little whether or not society views a hypothetical claim as reasonable.
By proceeding to this discussion, the Court devalued the importance of
the subjective prong. This should have produced "a single inquiry, i.e.,
is the assertion of constitutionally protected rights one. . . that reflects
'well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms' or that should reflect
such freedoms upon 'normative inquiry?' "246 Indeed, the Smith court
indicated that absent a subjective expectation of privacy "a normative
inquiry would be proper. '247 Inexplicably, however, the Court did not
pursue any normative inquiry in Smith.
The full effect of this shift to a single inquiry can be seen in the
recent cases. In these cases, the Court did not follow the two-pronged
analysis in either form or substance. For example, only in United
States v. Karo248 was the individual's expectation of privacy high-
lighted, and even there, the extent of the defendant's expectation was
measured by reference to the place within which the search occurred.
In the other cases, the notion that a subjective inquiry had any impor-
tance is devalued and ultimately rejected. Moreover, unlike Smith,
none of the cases discussed the credibility of the defendant's claimed
expectations. Instead, the discussions in the cases assumed a subjective
expectation of privacy and then proceeded to show how any expectation
was unreasonable.2 49
Oliver v. United States250 is a good example of this approach. In
Oliver and its companion case, Maine v. Thornton, the defendants
posted no trespassing signs, and located the fields of marijuana on re-
245. Katz, 389 U.S. at 588.
246. Burkhoff, supra note 75, at 528.
247. 442 U.S. at 740-41 n.5.
248. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
249. This is not a new trick. See Note, Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91
YALE L. J. 313, 328 (1981).
250. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
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mote parts of their land. The marijuana patches were hidden from view
by woods, fences, or embankments and were not visible from any point
on adjacent land. Given these facts, the Maine Supreme Court in
Thornton concluded that "a person would have had to search to find
the patches" and granted the defendant's motion to suppress. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion. The Su-
preme Court rejected the contention that these precautions could legiti-
mize the defendant's expectation of privacy. The correct focus was
"whether the government's intrusion infringes on the personal and soci-
etal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." 51 In other words, it
did not matter what the defendants thought about their privacy or
what they did to protect it so long as the objective (and abstract)
boundary of the fourth amendment was not crossed.
The Court proceeded at a level of generality in which subjective
facts were immaterial. The Court's "plain language" rationale ren-
dered subjective factors meaningless. The focus was on the words of the
amendment and not the expectations of the defendant. No precautions
undertaken to protect one's privacy could transform a "field" into a
"house." No belief that one's land was protected from intrusion even if
supported by civil and criminal trespass laws would make fields into
"persons" or "effects" or "papers." If the item or area searched were
within one of the defined areas, the fourth amendment protected it. If
not, the fourth amendment was not applicable.
The Court's second rationale also illustrates this point. The Court
contrasted open fields against those enclosures of privacy protected by
the amendment. Open fields did not provide a setting for protected "in-
timate activities." Moreover there was no societal interest in protecting
activities conducted in the open fields. Open fields were accessible in
ways that homes or offices were not.252
This might have been true of open fields in general but it had little
application to the facts in the case before the Court. The landowner
who planted marijuana in a field alongside a public road could not in-
sulate his activity by posting a single no trespassing sign to a tree or
building or three feet high fence. This was not the situation in either
Oliver or Thornton. Both defendants took precautions to shut out the
casual observer. The family out for a drive in the country or the police-
man out on patrol could not stumble upon the fields any more than
they could stumble into a house with the doors locked but with the
251. 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
252. Id. at 1741.
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windows unbarred. In order to find the fields the police were forced to
engage in purposeful behavior. 253 In short, they had to and did look for
marijuana patches. If a subjective inquiry had any place here these
factors would have been important but the court looked at the open
fields in the abstract, and, thus, made the particular facts immaterial.
The same level of abstraction was used in Hudson v. Palmer.2 54 In
this case Chief Justice Burger's opinion spoke in the most general
terms about balancing the "interests of society" in the security of its
penal institutions "against" the interest of the prisoner in privacy
within his cell. Because the security interests in general outweigh the
privacy interests in general, the Chief Justice concluded that prisoners
could have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells. In sup-
port of his conclusions, the Chief Justice cited statistics purporting to
show the high incidence of violent crime in prisons and the need for
tight security. There was no indication, however, that such concerns
were behind the "shakedown" search of Hudson's cell. More to the
point was the Court's rejection of Hudson's claim that the fourth
amendment protected prisoners from searches designed solely to harass.
The Chief Justice would not even consider the issue because it was
merely a challenge to the reasonableness of the particular search of
Hudson's cell. In its haste to draw a bright-line rule the Court created
the anomalous possibility of an unreasonable search never being a
search at all. 255
United States v. Jacobsen2" provided the final example. The
Court's holding that the inadvertent discovery of the cocaine by the
private third party vitiated the defendants' expectation of privacy en-
tirely removed from the fourth amendment any inquiry into the subjec-
tive expectation of privacy. Without a doubt when the defendants
253. Compare Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrantless OSHA inspection
violated the fourth amendment when inspection went beyond public area); and Donovan v. Lone
Star, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 769 (1984) (no fourth amendment activity when administrative subpoena
delivered in public lobby). See Grano, supra note 47, at 436 ("[Wlhat the employer [in Barlow's]
found offensive was not mere presence, but presence for the purpose of seeking out information.").
254. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
255. It would bend the word beyond recognition to say that a bad-faith search of a prisoner's
letters was reasonable. The Hudson Court avoided this semantic nonsense with its own nonsense
that harassment searches did not raise any fourth amendment issue because, in general, prison
searches were not covered by the fourth amendment. To be sure, fourth amendment law has not
flinched in the past from terming reasonable police conduct an unreasonable search. See, e.g.,
Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Alschuler, supra note 156, at 233. But Cf. United States v. Leon, 104
S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (exclusionary rule not applied if police act in good faith reliance on search
warrant).
256. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
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placed their package with Federal Express they did not expect the gov-
ernment to search it.257 This expectation did not change when the pack-
age was damaged and then inspected by the courier. The Court rea-
soned, however, that these actions did not intrude upon any legitimate
expectations of privacy the defendants may have had in the package.
Thus, the protections of the fourth amendment turned on the actions of
the third party and not on any change in the defendants' expectation of
privacy.
Justice White pursued this point. He claimed that the majority
"ignore[d] an individual's subjective expectations" by appraising the
reasonableness of an invasion of privacy "on the basis of the facts as
they existed at the time that the invasion occurred. '258 He noted that
the Jacobsen holding could not "rest on the proposition that the owner
no longer [had] a subjective expectation of privacy" because, as Justice
Stevens observed in Walter v. United States, "a person's expectation of
privacy cannot be altered by subsequent events of which he was
unaware."
259
V. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING A LEGITIMATE OR
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
Without a subjective prong, the Court's privacy test boils down to one
question: What expectations of privacy would society recognize as rea-
sonable? This formulation is internally inconsistent. A test that mea-
sures the legitimacy of the defendant's expectations has no context if
the defendant's actual expectations are not taken into account. The bet-
ter question to ask, and the one which the Court appears to be answer-
ing is, what interests does the fourth amendment protect?
2 11
257. In its discussion of the legality of the field test the Court drew a distinction between a
legitimate expectation of privacy and a "subjective expectation of not being discovered." 104 S.
Ct. at 1661 n.22 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). This distinction is simply
the difference between what privacy one expects and what privacy society recognizes. By empha-
sizing this distinction the Court unnecessarily narrows the scope of the privacy protected by the
fourth amendment. See Posner, supra note 153 (Privacy includes both secrecy and solitude.
Neither aspect has fared well in the Burger Court.).
258. 104 S. Ct. at 1667.
259. 447 U.S. at 659 n.12.
260. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 385 ("The key to the Amendment is the question of what
interest it protects."); See also Burkhoff, supra note 75, at 528. ("[Ils the assertion of constitu-
tionally protected privacy right one . . . that reflects 'well-recognized Fourth Amendment free-
dom?' "); Posner, supra note 153, at 188 (reasonable expectation of privacy formulation is circu-
lar because whether or not a defendant has such an expectation depends on what the legal rule is).
In an attempt to reconcile the expectation language with the fourth amendment one commentator
suggested that the fourth amendment does not simply protect expectations of privacy rather, it
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The precise contours of this inquiry have never been outlined, how-
ever. In general, judges and commentators have agreed that the focus
must be outside the amendment."' Justice Harlan suggested that the
analysis focus on an assessment of "the nature of a particular practice
and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security
balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law en-
forcement." 62 For Professor Amsterdam,
[T]he ultimate question . . . is a value judgment. It is whether, if the
particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to
go unregulated by constitutional restraints the amount of privacy and
freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass in-
consistent with the aims of a free and open society.263
Justice Rehnquist indicated that "legitimation of expectations of
privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment . . "24
All of these formulations are normative. Their details must be fil-
led in through application in particular cases and the line-drawing inev-
itable in judicial decision.2 6 5 In this process, however, a court needs a
set of criteria to inform its judgment. If the question concerns the in-
terests protected by the amendment then courts must precisely identify
the interests implicated by the particular police activity. Moreover, in
assessing these interests the Court must justify its decision by reference
to some value inherent in the fourth amendment. 26 Otherwise, deci-
sions on the reasonableness of privacy interests would reflect only the
subjective preferences of five Supreme Court justices.2 7 Moreover,
protects the right to have certain expectations of privacy. Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz
Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154, 155-56 (1977). This is simply another way of
asking what the fourth amendment protects.
261. See generally, Loewy, Protecting Citizens From Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of
the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C.L.
REv. 329 (1984); Alschuler, supra note 64; Bacigal, The Jury as a Source of Reasonable Search
and Seizure Law, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 739.
262. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Amsterdam,
supra note 56, at 375 ("[I]f the understandable temptation to be responsive to every relevant
shading of every relevant variation of every relevant complexity is not restrained, then we shall
have a Fourth Amendment with all the character and consistency of a Rorschach blot.").
263. Amsterdam, supra note 56 at 403. Immediately after asking this grand question, Profes-
sor Amsterdam admitted that it was "a perfectly impossible question for the Supreme Court to
put forth as a test of Fourth Amendment coverage." Id.
264. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12. But see Posner, supra note 153, at 188 n.41
(statement incompatible with holdings in the participant monitoring cases).
265. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 408-09.
266. Ashdown, supra note 64, at 1302.
267. Bloom, The Supreme Court and Its Purported Preference for Search Warrants, 50
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without clear criteria for decision, a court would be tempted to provide
a post hoc justification for the search of an obviously guilty person.2 68
Prior to the 1983-84 term the Supreme Court never specifically de-
tailed its criteria. In Smith v. Maryland, for example, Justice Black-
mun indicated that when a defendant had no subjective expectation of
privacy "a normative inquiry would be proper" but he did not outline
the factors a court should consider in making the inquiry. 9
The Court's treatment of property interests were indicative of the
murkiness in this area. In two cases the Court seemed to hold that
ownership was a necessary and sufficient condition to invoke fourth
amendment protection.270 In Rawlings v. Kentucky, however, the Court
held that a defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy when
drugs for which he claimed ownership were found in his companion's
purse. 271 Because arcane concepts of property law no longer were dis-
positive of the issue, the Court in Rawlings looked at all of the circum-
stances surrounding the search to determine if any expectation of pri-
vacy was reasonable.72 One wonders what was so arcane about
ownership that the Court in Rawlings would reject it totally. It would
seem that at the very least the fourth amendment protected a citizen's
interest in his or her property.273 After Rawlings it was not clear
whether ownership was a protected fourth amendment interest at all or
whether it was one minor factor for a court to consider.274
The most recent cases do no provide any more guidance. In Oliver,
Justice Powell got off to a promising start by outlining three factors
TENN. L. REv. 231, 235, n.14, (1983) (determination of when an expectation of privacy exists is a
subjective exercise the outcome of which is unpredictable: it depends upon who does the
determination).
268. Cf. Burkhoff, supra note 75, at 557.
269. 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979).
270. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S. Ct. 961, (1969) (houseowner has
standing to challenge placement of electronic bug even if none ot his conversations overheard);
and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (no fourth amendment claim where passengers had no
ownership or possessory interest in the car in which they were riding).
271. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
272. Id. at 104-06. These included the length of time Rawlings knew his companion; the
infrequency with which he used her purse; his inability to prevent others from gaining access to
the purse; that another person looked in the purse several hours earlier; that he had not taken
normal precautions to protect the privacy of his property; and his admitted belief that the purse
was going to be searched. For a particularly devastating analysis of Rawlings, see LAFAVE, supra
note 21, at 224-28.
273. Ashdown, supra note 64, at 1329; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Test, supra
note 64, at 180-82; Note, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amendment Protection
After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIo ST. L. J. 709 (1977); Alschuler, supra note 64, at 6-8 n.12
(1983).
274. Ashdown, supra note 64, at 1325, 1327.
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which a court should consider: the intention of the Framers, the uses to
which a location is put, and our "societal understanding that certain
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from governmental inva-
sion."'2 75 In spite of the delineation, it was not clear from the opinion
how the analysis should proceed. The Court found that the language of
the amendment indicated the Framers' intent to carry forward the
common-law distinction between fields and houses into the fourth
amendment. 27 ' Ascertaining the Framers' interest was a legitimate
source of fourth amendment law, but the Court's approach in Oliver
proved too much and too little. For example, the Framers surely were
aware that the offensive writs of assistance authorized general searches
of their commercial premises as well as their dwellings. Yet the lan-
guage of the amendment does not mention commercial establishments.
By the logic of Oliver, this should evidence the intent of the Framers to
exclude commercial establishments, but the Court had previously held
that offices and other places of business were within the ambit of the
fourth amendment.277 On the other hand, the facts in Oliver indicated
extensive governmental intrusion upon a person's property. This activ-
ity is not governed by any of the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment and may only be bounded by the vague contours of the due pro-
cess clause.
The Court "misperceives the level of generality" with which a
fourth amendment analysis proceeds.278 Unlike other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the motivation behind the passage of the fourth amend-
ment was clear: to prohibit general searches. If this were its purpose,
then it would be reasonable to conclude that the Framers wanted to
regulate a kind of governmental activity and not necessarily to strictly
define the limits of the amendment's scope. Seen in this light, the cor-
rect focus must then be on the conduct of the police: the degree to
which such conduct resembles a general search. The more this conduct
approaches a general search, the more reasonable a person's expecta-
tion of privacy becomes. This cannot be the sole criterion for decision,
however. Professor Amsterdam has pointed out the dangers of too strict
an adherence to this posture.279 Nevertheless, courts should be particu-
larly sensitive when police activity becomes indiscriminate and wide-
ranging.
275. 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
276. Id.
277. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
278. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. at 1748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
279. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 361-66.
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The Court did little with the second factor. The Court simply as-
serted that "there is no societal interest in protecting the privacy" of
activities that occur in the open field. Because open fields are not the
setting for intimate activities and because they are more accessible
than homes or offices any expectation of privacy asserted in them is not
reasonable.280 But the fourth amendment does not only protect those
activities which the government considers important. Rather, it protects
that "sense of security" fundamental to a free society. That sense of
security can be violated by governmental snooping on silly, unimpor-
tant, or impractical activities.28 1
While Justice Powell's approach was too narrow, Justice Mar-
shall's was too broad. In his dissent he stated that the "inquiry requires
analysis of the sorts of uses to which a given space is susceptible." '282
Thus, he discussed how some people use remote areas for a whole range
of activities, including solitary walks, lover's trysts, and farming.8 '
Taken to its limit, this approach renders a use analysis meaningless for
almost any area could be put to almost any hypothetical use. Looking
at the uses of property is really part of the question of accessibility. It
is unreasonable for a person to plant marijuana in a public park or for
a couple to have sex in the lobby of a hotel, not because those areas are
not suspectible to those uses but because those areas are used by and
accessible to other people. If that same couple moved upstairs to a
room in the hotel their expectation of privacy would then be reasonable
because the rest of the world would then be excluded.
Perhaps the danger in analyzing the uses to which the property is
put is the ease with which a court can assert that an expectation of
privacy is not reasonable because the defendant was engaged in an ille-
gal activity. In several cases the Court seemed to be heading in this
direction. The ease with which Justice Powell rejected any societal in-
terest in the cultivation of crops seemed to rest on the illegality of the
particular crop in Oliver. In Jacobsen, the Court held that a chemical
test which only revealed whether or not a particular substance was co-
caine did not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. Because
Congress outlawed "private" possession of cocaine, governmental con-
duct which revealed whether a substance was cocaine, and no other
arguably private fact, compromised no legitimate expectation of
280. 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
281. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
282. 104 S. Ct. at 1748.
283. Id.
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privacy. 84
This seems at odds with Katz. In Katz, the use of the phone to
transmit wagering information was a crime. The content of the daily
conversations Katz had were illegal. To the Katz Court, the important
question was not whether the act was a crime but whether the defen-
dant could rely on any privacy in the context of his admittedly illegal
activity. In Jacobsen, however, any expectation of privacy in the nature
of the powder was unreasonable because its possession was illegal. It
could be that these cases signal the adoption of Professor Loewy's the-
sis that the protection of the fourth amendment does not include the
right to be secure from the government's discovery of evidence of a
crime. 285
The final factor in Oliver-that certain enclosures receive en-
hanced constitutional protection-followed from Payton v. New
York.2 8 In that case, the Court held that the fourth amendment pro-
hibited a warrantless entry into a suspect's home to make a routine
felony arrest. The Court noted that the "physical entry into the home
was the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth amendment
was directed.' 287 Thus, the warrant requirement protects "the very core
of the amendment: the right of a [person] to retreat into his home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. 2 88 As we
have seen, this principle was applied in several other cases.2 89 More-
over, it appears that location is the most important, if not the only,
factor in judging the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. At
the very least, a warrantless intrusion into the home is presumed unrea-
sonable while warrantless activity outside the home is presumptively
reasonable.
VI. THE NEW REASONABLENESS
By bringing back the protected place theory, removing the subjec-
tive prong of the Katz test, and providing precious little clarity for the
remaining prong, the Court has undermined the continuing vitality of
Katz. Its central premises are no longer tenable. Indeed, if Katz were
284. 104 S. Ct. at 1662.
285. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device For Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 1229 (1983).
286. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See generally Evans, Constitutional Restraints on Residential
Warrantless Arrests: More Protection for Privacy Interest on the Home, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1
(1982).
287. 445 U.S. at 1379.
288. Id.
289. See supra notes 115-229.
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decided today the result could very well be different. This process has
been underway for some time, however. During this time, the slow
death of Katz has caused a good deal of analytical tension and doctri-
nal confusion. The Court has sought to alleviate the tension by silently
using a balancing test in many of these cases. Its refusal to acknowl-
edge this test has only enhanced the confusion. United States v. Jacob-
sen 29 is the most recent example of this approach.
In Jacobsen, employees of the Federal Express office at the Minne-
apolis-St. Paul Airport examined a package which had been damaged
by a forklift. Inside the package they found five or six pieces of crum-
bled newspaper covering a tube about 10 inches long. The employees
cut open the tube and found a series of four ziplock plastic bags. They
discovered approximately six and one-half ounces of white powder in
the inner-most bag. They called the Drug Enforcement Administration,
but before the agents arrived, the Federal Express employees repacked
the package. When the agent arrived he repeated the previous inspec-
tion of the package. He removed a trace of powder and conducted a
chemical field test. The test indicated that the substance was cocaine.
Other agents arrived later, conducted a second chemical test, rewrap-
ped the package, obtained a search warrant, made a controlled deliv-
ery, and then arrested the defendants. 91 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. 92
It held that the validity of the search warrant depended on the validity
of the warrantless chemical test. Because the test was a significant ex-
pansion of the earlier private search, the DEA agents should have ob-
tained search warrants before performing the test.293 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with a decision
of the Sixth Circuit2 94 and because chemical field tests for drugs had
290. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
291. Id. at 1655. Controlled deliveries of contraband occur most often when a common car-
rier discovers contraband in freight or luggage it is transporting. Upon notification of the authori-
ties, the contraband is returned to its original container and delivered to its destination. When the
person to whom it is delivered accepts the package, he is arrested and the package is seized and
searched by the police. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (citing United States v. Bulgier,
618 F.2d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980)). The possibility of a fourth
amendment challenge to the search subsequent to the controlled delivery was foreclosed by Illinois
v. Andreas which held that unless there was a substantial likelihood that the contents of the
package had been changed there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in its previously re-
vealed contents.
292. Jacobsen v. United States, 683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1982).
293. Id. at 299.
294. United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 927
(1982). The facts in Barry are similar to the facts in Jacobsen. The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in somewhat backward fashion, held that the government violated the fourth amendment by
19841
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played an important role in the enforcement of narcotics laws. 295
The Court approached the case in two steps. First, the Court fo-
cused on the police conduct beginning with the inspection of the pack-
age up to and including the removal of the powder needed to conduct
the test. Second, the Court looked at the legality of the chemical test.
To address the first issue the Court had to apply the legal standard
announced in Walter v. United States. 96 In that case, F.B.I. agents
viewed obscene films after receiving them from a private party to whom
they were mistakenly sent.297 The private party read the suggestive la-
bels on the containers, took out the films and held a few frames up to
the light. After ascertaining their nature, they turned the films over to
the F.B.I. The F.B.I. screened the films after holding them for several
months.2 98 The defendants were indicted on obscenity charges based on
the interstate transportation of some of the films and the Fifth Circuit
seizing the drugs without a warrant but that the exclusionary rule did not apply because the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the package. Id. at
918-19. The court reasoned that the defendants took the risk of exposure by giving the package
over to the carrier. Id. at 919. By failing to take adequate precautions to disguise the appearance
of the contraband the defendant could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The
court analogized its holding to Rawlings v. Kentucky where the Supreme Court held that a defen-
dant who had voluntarily placed contraband in a companion's purse no longer had any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contraband. Id. at 919. Finally, the Barry court distinguished Walter
v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) on the basis of the first amendment interest present, be-
cause the owner of the films still maintained a privacy interest in them when they were seized, and
because viewing the films was not perfunctory in nature. 673 F.2d at 919-20. For a discussion of
Barry and the Eighth Circuit opinion in Jacobsen, see Comment, The Fourth Amendment Fol-
lowing Private Searches: Is There a Privacy Interest To Protect, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 172 (1983).
Other Courts faced similar fact patterns with equally divided results. See, e.g., United States v.
Andrews, 618 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1980) (warrantless field test upheld without discussion); People
v. Adler, 50 N.Y.2d 730, 409 N.E.2d 888, 431 N.Y.S.2d 412, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980)
(warrantless field test unconstitutional).
295. 104 S. Ct. at 1656.
296. 447 U.S. 649 (1980). It is axiomatic that the fourth amendment does not apply to
private searches. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). See generally Burkhoff, Not So
Private Searches and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 627 (1981). Thus, it is immaterial if
the private party conducted a search that would have been impermissible if performed by the
government. 104 S. Ct. at 1658. The reasonableness of the government's conduct "must be ap-
praised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time" the governmental activity took place.
Id. In Jacobsen then, the focus was on the DEA agents' inspection of the package upon their
arrival. Id. at 1657.
297. Employees of "L'Eggs Products, Inc." received a shipment of 871 boxes of 8-millimeter
film depicting homosexual activity addressed to "Leggs, Inc." 447 U.S. at 651. Although there
was no "Leggs, Inc.," Leggs was the nickname of a woman in the employ of one of the defen-
dant's companies. Id. at 651 n.l. Justice Stevens termed the facts in Walter "bizzarre." Id. at
651.
298. Id. at 651-52. The exact date of the screening is not clear but at least one film was not
viewed until more than two months after the F.B.I. had taken possession. Id. at 652.
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affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress.2 99 The
Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of
the Court and delivered an opinion in which he was joined by Justice
Stewart. The Stevens opinion held that the unauthorized screening of
the films by the F.B.I. was an illegal search because it was a significant
expansion of the private party's search. 300 Although four justices dis-
sented, they were in substantial agreement as to the legal standard to
be applied but disagreed on its specific application.301
The fragmentation of the Walter Court made it difficult to inter-
pret the case. It could be read for the rule that only those items left in
plain view by the private party may be searched by the government. 30
According to this reasoning, because the films were not in plain view
when the agents arrived, the subsequent screening violated the fourth
amendment. On the other hand, the case could be read for the proposi-
tion that the police may go beyond the literal scope of the private
search when the defendant's expectation of privacy was completely
frustrated and the contents of a container were obvious from the nature
of the package. 303
299. Walter v. United States, 592 F.2d 788 (1979).
300. 447 U.S. at 657. The Court reasoned that the scope of an official search is limited to the
terms of its authorization. Id. at 656. This principle also applies whenever the government seeks to
make use of a "private party's invasion of another person's privacy." Id. at 657. Thus, the govern-
ment may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an indepen-
dent search. Id. The projection of the films was a search because, prior to their screening "one
could only draw an inference" about their content. Id. Screening the films was a significant expan-
sion of the search presumably because it provided information not already available to the author-
ities. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1984) (warrantless in-home monitoring of beeper
unconstitutional because it revealed previously unknown information).
301. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion. 447 U.S. at 662. He was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun would have upheld the convic-
tions because by the time the F.B.I. received the films, the defendants had no remaining expecta-
tion of privacy. Id. at 463. He disagreed with Justice Stevens that the screening was an expansion
of the private search because the containers "clearly revealed the nature of the contents," and the
F.B.I. received the films only after the labels had been "exposed to the public." Id. at 663. Jus-
tices White and Brennan concurred in part and in the judgment. Id. at 660. Although they agreed
that the screening was a search, they did not agree that the government would duplicate a private
search without raising fourth amendment issues. Id. at 660-61. Their position is farther from
Justice Stevens than the dissent's. Justice Marshall provided the fifth vote for reversal by concur-
ring in the judgment. Id. at 660. He did not write an opinion, however.
302. Even though some circumstances-for example, if the results of the private search
are in plain view when materials are turned over to the Government-may justify the
Government's re-examination of the materials, surely the government may not exceed
the scope of the private search unless it has a right to make an independent search.
Id. at 657. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) where the court commented that its
holding was supported by the reasoning underlying the "plain view" doctrine.
303. 447 U.S. at 658 n.l 2 (consigner's expectation of privacy measured by condition of pack-
age at time of shipment because private search in Walter only partially frustrated expectation of
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Jacobsen followed the latter reading. The Court held that the in-
spection by the DEA agent was not a search for purposes of the fourth
amendment because "[tjhe agent's viewing of what a private party has
freely made available for his inspection did not violate the fourth
amendment."" 4 The defendants lost any expectation of privacy in the
contents of the box when the Federal Express employees discovered the
cocaine 5308 When that happened, "the Fourth Amendment [did] not
prohibit governmental use of the now-non-private information. 3 06
The Court cited the White line of cases in support of this interpre-
tation of Walter. There is a critical difference between the two, how-
ever. In the voluntary disclosure cases, the individual decided whether
or not to reveal information to a third party and how much he should
reveal. This element of control was an important factor in the holding
of these cases. In Couch v. United States, the Court rejected the defen-
dant's fourth amendment claim because "there can be little expectation
of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that
mandatory disclosure of much of the information contained therein is
required in an income tax return. ' 30 7 To the same effect was United
States v. Miller where the Court found no fourth amendment interest
in personal financial records being held by a bank because they con-
tained "only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and ex-
posed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." 30 8 The
risk of these cases was controlled by the defendant. In Jacobsen, the
defendant did not voluntarily reveal any information to a third party.
The risk of disclosure came about because of the actions of a third
party over which they had no control.
The participant monitoring cases like White present the same ana-
lytical distinction. In the typical bugged informant case the defendant
controlled the flow of information. 0 9 He took the risk of disclosure and
could not later elevate his misplaced trust into a constitutional issue.310
The risk assumed by the Jacobsens did not arise until the package was
damaged. Because the Jacobsens were unaware of the damage to the
privacy).
304. 104 S. Ct. at 1660.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1658.
307. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
308. 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
309. See, e.g., Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206 (1966), where the defendant drug dealer invited
the police informant to his house and encouraged a continuing commercial relationship.
310. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966).
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package, it was illogical to cast the case in risk terms when they had no
knowledge of the risk they had assumed and did not voluntarily reveal
any information to a third party.""
Justice White criticized the majority's reading of Walter in an
opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.1 ' He noted that Wal-
ter left open the question whether or not the F.B.I. would have needed
a warrant if the private parties had screened the films. 313 In his view
neither Walter nor any other previous case supported the Court's hold-
ing that the government "may proceed to conduct [its] own search of
the same or lesser scope as the private search without first obtaining a
warrant."3 " Justice White pursued what he saw as the "logical impli-
cations" of the majority opinion. He found he would be:
[Hlard-pressed to distinguish this case, which involves a private
search, from (1) one in which the private party's knowledge, later
communicated to the government, that a particular container con-
cealed contraband and nothing else arose from his presence at the
time the container was sealed; (2) one in which the private party
learned that a container concealed contraband and nothing else when
it was previously opened in his presence; or (3) one in which the pri-
vate party knew to a certainty that a container concealed contraband
and nothing else as a result of conversations with its owner. In each of
these cases, the approach adopted by the Court today would seem to
suggest that the owner of the container has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in its contents and that government agents opening that
container without a warrant on the strength of information provided
by the private party would not violate the Fourth Amendment.313
A close reading of Jacobsen proves Justice White's fears to be ex-
aggerated. The case should be limited to those situations where the po-
lice were lawfully in possession of the container in which the contra-
band was located and where it was a virtual certainty that the
311. The Court's conclusion is not surprising because neither the voluntary disclosure cases
nor the participant monitoring cases have much to do with privacy. Posner, supra note 153, at
213. Judge Posner argues that the fourth amendment protects both traditional property interest
and more general interests in bodily integrity, mental tranquility, and freedom of movement as
well as the privacy of information but that it does not protect a criminal's interest in avoiding
punishment. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 49, 51. Thus, he
would enforce the amendment not through the exclusion of illegally seized evidence but through
damage actions against the offending officers. Id. at 53.
312. 104 S. Ct. at 1663.
313. Id. at 1666.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1667.
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container concealed contraband.-" This interpretation is supported by
the rationale of the "plain view doctrine." The government had prior
lawful access to the container, expectations of privacy had been dimin-
ished, and probable cause was established by the condition of the
container.31 7 All of Justice White's hypotheticals fall outside this inter-
pretation of Jacobsen. Thus, any search of the containers would have to
be justified in conventional fashion. This test realistically protects the
fourth amendment rights of the owner while at the same time allows
the police to investigate drug offenses. By requiring the presence of
contraband to be shown to a virtual certainty Jacobsen prevents routine
warrantless inspections of packages but does not restrain the police in
the exceptional case when a third party presents a package to them in
such condition that its contents are obvious. Requiring a warrant in the
latter case would exalt form over substance, but requiring a warrant in
the former is protective of fourth amendment values.
Reading Jacobsen to require the police to have a virtual certainty
that contraband is in a container still begs the question of the privacy
interest of the defendant. Even a virtual certainty that a house contains
contraband may not be sufficient to justify a warrantless entry.3" 8 In-
316. "[Tlhe precise character of the white powder's visibility to the naked eye is far less
significant than the facts that the container could no longer support any expectation of privacy,
and that it was virtually certain that it contained nothing but contraband." 104 S. Ct. at 1660
n.17. See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (owner loses privacy interest once cer-
tainty that container conceals contraband is found).
317. The condition of the container from which the virtual certainty of contraband is de-
duced can be analogized to the opaque party balloon in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983),
which the plurality noted "spoke volumes as to its contents." Id. at 743. This reading of Jacobsen
also reconciles it with Walter and Andreas. Compare Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649
(1980) (government could only draw inferences of content of films prior to screening) and Illinois
v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (once a container has been found to a certainty to contain illicit
drugs, the contraband becomes like objects within the plain view of police).
A narrow reading of Jacobsen is supported by the Court's protected place cases. Suppose a
dinner guest leaves the table and, unnoticed by the host, rummages through the host's dresser
drawers. The guest finds contraband. The next day the guest (who will never be invited to dinner
again) relays news of his discovery to the police. Can the police enter the house without a warrant
and duplicate the dinner guest's actions? Jacobsen would seem to allow this activity. Once the
guest discovered the contraband the owner lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in it. When
the police duplicated the private search they did not intrude upon any legitimate privacy
expectations.
Cases like Karo, however, argue against this result. They create a zone of privacy in and
immediately surrounding a house. Even though the host above would have lost any expectation of
privacy in the information about his possession of cocaine, he retains an expectation of privacy in
the place the cocaine is located. By the same token, this reading of Jacobsen confirms the Court's
resurrection of the protected place theory. See supra text accompanying notes 115-229.
318. Although the full permissible scope of warrantless entries into a house has not yet been
determined, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), it is generally accepted that such
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deed, absent the private search, which revealed the contents of the box
in Jacobsen, the government could not have searched the package with-
out a warrant even if they were certain that it contained contraband.3 19
The virtual certainty reading of Jacobsen shows that the underly-
ing basis for the Court's holding was the reasonableness of the govern-
ment's action under all the circumstances. The Court has relied on a
reasonableness analysis in other cases. In Camara v. Municipal Court,
the Court established an analytical basis for future decisions based on
what it called the "constitutional mandate of reasonableness."320 In
such cases, courts must balance "the need to search against the inva-
sion which the search entails." '21 In Terry v. Ohio, the court applied
the Camara balancing principle to uphold a police officer's brief deten-
tion and subsequent "frisk" of a suspect.322 The Court found that the
case dealt with: "an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift
action predicated upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could
not be, subjected to the warrant procedure."3 3 Given this unique situa-
tion the case had to be tested under the reasonableness clause of the
fourth amendment and the balancing of the need to search against the
intrusion was the correct legal standard. 2" The Court rejected an "all
or nothing model of justification and regulation" because it would pro-
vide insufficient constitutional regulation of the scope of police conduct
while at the same time diverting attention "from the central inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment-the reasonableness in all the circum-
stances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security. 32 3
Katz, however, set up an all or nothing model when the question
was whether or not police activity was a search. The strictness of this
entries are permissible only if exigent circumstances exist. Compare Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (warrantless entry search in pursuit of suspects justified when delay would endanger
lives); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (warrantless entry into home justified when
suspect retreated from doorway to avoid police); and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (Hayden supports exigency requirement by "negative implication").
319. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (warrantless search of footlocker
invalid even though its owner matched a drug trafficker profile, unusually heavy for its size, leaked
a substance used to mask odor of marijuana, and produced a positive alert to a dog sniff).
320. 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
321. Id. at 534.
322. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See generally LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40 (1968).
323. 392 U.S. at 20.
324. Id. at 21.
325. Id. at 17-19.
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model may explain why the privacy discussion in cases like Jacobsen is
so sterile. To avoid the semantic nonsense of- terming a reasonable
search an illegal one, courts have strained to squeeze the case within
the contours of the Katz test.326
The Court in Jacobsen appeared to substitute an analysis of the
reasonableness of the government conduct for a true Katz privacy in-
quiry. The virtual certainty rule was in essence a balancing test. As in
Terry, "effective crime prevention and detection" provided a significant
basis for an on-the-spot inspection of the package. This was balanced
against the slight interest in privacy left in the container and the illegal
nature of the substance. Under these circumstances, the slight intrusion
on the defendant's privacy-"brushing aside a crumpled newspaper
and picking up the tube"-was reasonable.
This conclusion was supported by the Court's inability to maintain
the tension between the threshold definitional issue and its balancing
approach. At several points, the language in the opinion lapsed from
the former issue to the latter. When discussing the private search doc-
trine, the Court stated that the "reasonableness of an official invasion
of the citizen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as
they existed at the time that invasion occurred. ' 327 At this stage, how-
ever, the reasonableness of police conduct begs the question; the perti-
nent question is whether or not the fourth amendment applies. Later in
the opinion, the Court indicated that both the agent's initial inspection
of the package and the chemical field test "were reasonable for essen-
tially the same reason. '"328
Although such lapses could be the result of carelessness, the
Court's treatment of the field test issue indicated that such was not the
case. The Court began by phrasing the question in definitional terms:
"We must first determine whether this [chemical test] can be consid-
ered a 'search' subject to the Fourth Amendment--did it infringe an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasona-
ble?" 32 9 The Court concluded that the field test was not a search be-
cause no arguably private fact could be revealed by the test. Congress
chose to treat the interest in privately possessing cocaine as illegitimate.
Thus, a defendant had no legitimate privacy interest in preventing the
disclosure of the contraband nature of cocaine or other drugs. 330 But
326. Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.2.
327. 104 S. Ct. at 1657.
328. Id. at 1659.
329. Id. at 1661.
330. Id. at 1662.
640 [Vol. 7:587
FOURTH AMENDMENT
this is another tautology. The Court was saying the defendant's privacy
interest was illegitimate because it was illegitimate. Surely the Court
cannot mean that a defendant can never have a privacy interest in con-
traband. A good deal of fourth amendment law would be implicitly
overruled. Instead, the Court balanced the limited scope of the field
test against the importance (or lack of importance) of the privacy inter-
est asserted.331
Finally, a comparison of the Court's treatment of the seizure ques-
tions with its treatment of the search questions reveals the reasonable-
ness foundation lurking under the latter. The Court applied a balancing
test to justify both the seizure of the box for its initial inspection by the
agents and the subsequent seizure of a small amount of the cocaine to
conduct the field test. The Court noted that it was "apparent" that the
box contained contraband and that it was virtually certain the sub-
stance was cocaine. In addition, the intrusion was extremely limited in
scope in both instances.3 32 Thus the seizure was reasonable because of
the limited information which it revealed and the minimal impact it
had on any protected interest-an analysis that virtually tracks the
analysis of the search issues.
The Court would alleviate much confusion if it openly admitted its
use of a reasonableness approach. Jacobsen demonstrates how the
Court in fact pursued the question of reasonableness while still using
the form of the Katz test. A model of the fourth amendment that fo-
cuses on the reasonableness of police conduct is not without its
problems.333  As Professor Amsterdam put it, a view of the fourth
331. It's probably safe to assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circum-
stances comparable to those disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding;
in such cases no legitimate interest has been compromised.
Id. The Court relied on U.S. v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). In Place, the Court held that no
search occurred when a trained narcotics detection dog sniffed a suspect's luggage:
A "canine sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require
opening of the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would
remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through
the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through
this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the
sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, de-
spite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the
luggage, the information obtained is limited.
Id. The Jacobsen Court noted that Place applied because the likelihood that the government's
conduct would actually invade any legitimate privacy interest was "too remote to characterize the
testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment." 104 S. Ct. at 1662.
332. Id. at 1662-63.
333. The most precise judicial criticism of a balancing test came from Justice Brennan in
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) when he said:
[T]he protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consid-
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amendment which is sensitive to every nuance would resemble a Ror-
schach test instead of a constitutional doctrine.3 4 Nevertheless, a rea-
sonableness test would quickly get content from its application in par-
ticular cases. Moreover, a frank adoption of such a test would provide
more protection for fourth amendment interest than the now gutted
Katz test. Currently, the Court uses a reasonableness inquiry to ex-
amine cases like Jacobsen which, while not egregious violations of
fourth amendment privacy, nevertheless implicate fourth amendment
interests. Once the Court decides, however, that a case is not egregious,
it is constrained by the all or nothing model of Katz to declare that the
police activity is not a search and is without any fourth amendment
protection.
A more flexible standard would allow courts to regulate police con-
duct without unduly interfering with legitimate law enforcement activi-
ties. In Hudson v. Palmer, for example, an analysis which focused on
the reasonableness of the prison searches would more adequately pro-
tect a prisoner's legitimate interest in being free from harassment
searches. Under this approach, the prisoner's interests would be entitled
to greater weight. At the same time, the security of the prison would
not be harmed because random, shakedown searches would be reasona-
ble. Clearly the governmental interests in security would outweigh the
personal interest in such searches. The Hudson Court's actual analysis
sacrifices all legitimate fourth amendment interests prisoners have to
the interest of security. Such a result betrays the values for which the
fourth amendment stands.
Finally, by applying a balancing test sub silentio the Court risks
losing all fourth amendment protection to technological advances.
Technological advances are providing the government with better and
more efficient investigative tools. Electronic beepers and field tests for
drugs are two examples but there are many others.33 5 By woodenly ap-
eration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases,
especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by police officers en-
gaged in the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 16 (1948). A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police of-
ficers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the special circumstances they confront . . . . [Tihe
requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent ...
442 U.S. at 213-14.
334. Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 375. See also United States v.Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S.
543, 570 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (balancing becomes a way to condone unconstitutional
governmental conduct); Burkhoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Tri-
umph of An Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 151, 190-92 (1979).
335. See, e.g., Note, As Interactive Cable Enters, Does Privacy Go Out the Window, 4
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plying its diluted version of Katz the Court only makes it possible for
technology to reduce our privacy.3 6 Instead of a bulwark, the fourth
amendment guarantee will become a seive as better means to detect
crimes are invented.3 37 To prevent this from happening the Court must
either redefine the notion of the fourth amendment privacy to take
technological advances into account or openly admit that it employs a
multifactor balancing test to determine the reasonableness of govern-
mental investigative activity. A multifactor test would give the Court
more flexibility. This flexibility is vital in an age when technological
change occurs rapidly. Justice Brennan outlined such an approach in
his dissent.33 8 He argued that the Jacobsen rule "rendered irrelevant
the circumstances surrounding the use of the technique, the accuracy
of the technique, and the privacy interest upon which it intrudes."'3 If
the virtual certainty reading of Jacobsen is correct, then the majority
did take these three factors into account 3,40 The problem with the ma-
jority opinion was not the factors upon which it relied but its refusal to
acknowledge that it was employing a balancing test.
Justice Brennan went on to point out a more serious deficiency in
the majority's analysis when he noted that the decision left "no room to
consider whether the surveillance technique is employed randomly or
selectively. . ". ." ' He would employ a Camara balancing test in situ-
ations like Jacobsen taking into account the limited nature of the intru-
sion and the circumstances surrounding its use. 42
Justice Brennan's approach, although not significantly different
from the majority's, should be adopted by the Court. It makes clear
COMM. ENT. L. J. 781 (1983).
336. Cf LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.2.; Landever, Electronic Surveillance. Computers, and
the Fourth Amendment-The New Telecommunications Environment Calls for Reexamination
of Doctrine, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 597 (1984) (fourth amendment concepts of risk and choice inap-
propriate for modern technological environment).
337. Justice Brandeis stated in his often-quoted dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States:
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the gov-
ernment, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in Court
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring un-
expressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.
277 U.S. at 474. For a discussion of modern devices which partially fulfill Brandeis' prophecy, see
supra note 335.
338. 104 S. Ct. at 1671.
339. Id.
340. See supra notes 315-327.
341. 104 S. Ct. at 1671.
342. Id.
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what factors courts should consider when faced with unique situations,
an occurrence that will become more likely as technological advances
take place.343 More importantly, it would bring a range of surveillance
and investigative activity under the aegis of the fourth amendment. "
Otherwise, modern technology can only subtract from fourth amend-
ment protection.3, 5
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not been faithful to the Katz test. As this
article demonstrated, the Court has removed the subjective prong of
the Katz test. At the same time, it has not provided any criteria by
which to determine the objective reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy.
Moreover, the factors the Court has considered have led to results
inconsistent with Katz. Thus, the Katz test is a moribund principle of
fourth amendment law. In place of Katz, the Court has substituted a
revised version of the protected place theory. In cases where this theory
is inapplicable however, the Court has sub silentio employed a balanc-
ing test to determine the reasonableness of the government's conduct.
Because of the confusion this has caused, the Court should openly
adopt the balancing test outlined by Justice Brennan in his dissent in
Jacobsen. Brennan's test is clearer and more protective of fourth
amendment values.
343. See Landever, supra note 335.
344. 104 S. Ct. at 1671.
345. LAFAvE, supra note 21, at 87; See also Burkhoff, supra note 75, at 540; Yackle, supra
note 230, at 363 n.201.
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